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SUMMARY 
 
 
This thesis is formed of three separate essays. The essays are empirical in nature and use 
the Kagera Health and Development Survey from Tanzania. The survey spans a 19-year 
period offering a unique opportunity to study many long-run dynamic processes of 
development in rural Africa.  
 
In the first essay, a version of which was co-authored with Joachim De Weerdt, we use 
these data to shed light on how mass internal migration changes the nature of informal 
risk-sharing. By quantifying how shocks and consumption co-move across linked 
households, our analysis shows that migrants unilaterally insure their extended family 
members who remain at home. This finding contradicts risk-sharing models based on 
reciprocity, but is consistent with assistance driven by social norms. Migrants sacrifice 
three to five per cent of their consumption growth to provide this insurance, which seems 
too trivial to have a stifling effect on their growth through migration.  
 
The second essay studies the role of exogenous income shocks on long-term migration 
decisions. The results reveal that temperature shocks cause large fluctuations in 
household consumption and inhibit long-term migration among men. These findings 
suggest that liquidity constraints are binding and prevent potential migrants from tapping 
into the opportunities brought about by internal migration.  
 
The final essay focuses on child nutrition and examines whether under-nourished children 
are able to recover the height losses later in life. The essay questions the methods used in 
the existing empirical literature and challenges the conventional view that recovery is 
nearly impossible after five years of age. The empirical part of the essay documents how 
puberty offers an opportunity window for recovery in the case of children in Kagera. 
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1 Introduction 
Economic development is a dynamic process with a time scale of more than a few 
years. The scarcity of household-survey data covering long periods of time has 
meant that most empirical evidence on hypotheses about growth and development 
has come from cross-country aggregate time-series data. (Rosenzweig 2003p. 
112) 
This thesis in part is a paean to longitudinal surveys of households and individuals. 
Administering long panel surveys is costly but the benefits come, as pointed out above 
by Rosenzweig (2003), in the ability to document long-run development patterns and to 
investigate many of the most exciting questions in Development Economics. Or as 
Dercon, Krishnan, and Krutikova (2013)p. 16 put it:  
Village studies and long-term micro-data sets are not quite the current flavour in 
development economics research, but without them, we will not be able to 
document carefully long-term changes and create the new stylised facts for the 
next generation of development research. 
In this thesis, I employ a unique panel data from the Kagera region in Tanzania. At 19-
years, the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) is one of the longest running 
panel surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa. These data are described in detail in the next chapter 
with a focus on the latest round of the survey in 2010 that I participated in collecting. 
Attrition is a particular concern in any panel survey. Attrition is unlikely to be random 
and as such is likely to induce considerable biases in any estimates of welfare (Alderman 
et al. 2001, McKay and Lawson 2003). For these reasons, the KHDS survey has paid 
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particular attention to tracking individuals over time. The survey has maintained an 
exceptional tracking rate of panel respondents over its life providing unique research 
opportunities for examining long-run poverty and welfare trends in one part of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Using these data I contribute to two central themes within Development 
Economics: internal migration and nutrition.  
Historically, internal migration has moved in step with development and poverty 
reduction in both the rich developed and fast growing developing countries (Chenery and 
Syrquin 1975, Collier and Dercon 2009). Early models of structural formation saw 
internal migration assuming central stage when a country modernizes and moves away 
from subsistence agriculture (Lewis 1954, Ranis and Fei 1961). The demographic flows 
that accompany such modernisation processes will affect traditional rural communities 
profoundly. For migrants, geographical mobility is associated with large income gains 
and presents one of the main routes out of poverty (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2011, 
Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Todo 2013, Dercon, Krishnan, and Krutikova 2013).  
These internal migration flows are captured in the Kagera survey. By 2010, after 
excluding those who were deceased, more than half of the panel respondents had migrated 
away from their baseline village where they were first interviewed in 1991-94. More than 
95 per cent of these migrants are internal migrants and relocated either within the region 
or elsewhere in Tanzania. Less than four per cent migrated to another East-African 
country (mostly Uganda) and only 0.5 per cent moved outside East-Africa.  
In the first essay, joint work with Joachim De Weerdt, an attempt is made to understand 
how internal migration, a core part of the structural process, interacts with a traditional 
institution like informal risk-sharing to shape economic mobility and vulnerability. We 
find that migrants rapidly progress in life, while the living standards of those who decided 
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to stay grew at a much slower pace. By quantifying how shocks and consumption co-
move across linked households, we show how migrants unilaterally insure their extended 
family members at home. This finding contradicts risk-sharing models based on 
reciprocity, but is consistent with assistance driven by social norms. An average migrant 
sacrifices 2.9 to 5.0 percentage points out of a total growth of 108 per cent to insure his 
or her relatives. This estimate is equivalent to a ‘tax rate’ of between 2.7 and 4.6 per cent. 
We regard this tax rate as too trivial to exert any constraining effect on migrants. Our 
findings challenge the popular notion of the entrepreneurial African migrant who is 
weighed down by demands for assistance from those living at home. 
In the second essay I study whether financial constraints in the rural areas inhibit out-
migration. I use temperature changes as a measure of income shocks. Previous studies 
based on aggregated longitudinal cross-country data find that annual temperature changes 
cause large fluctuations in economic outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this essay, I 
present, to my knowledge, the first attempt to measure the impact of temperature changes 
using micro-level data from Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal how household per 
capita consumption co-moves with temperature in the previous growing season. 
Migration is associated with various costs that are borne up front. In the absence of well-
functioning credit markets, migration decisions should then respond to these negative 
income shocks induced by temperature changes. The empirical analysis based on discrete 
time-event techniques (Allison 1982, Jenkins 1995) confirms these predictions. I find that 
a one standard deviation increase in the previous year’s average monthly growing season 
temperature reduces the overall male migration rate by about 13 per cent. However, 
female migration is not affected by these shocks possibly due the fact that, in this 
Tanzanian context, such migration appears to be largely motivated by marriage and 
family. 
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The final essay of the thesis moves away from internal migration and focuses on 
childhood nutrition. Prolonged and severe malnutrition in utero and early childhood 
hinders neural and physical development. A conventional view in the literature is that 
early childhood conditions largely determine adult outcomes: stunted children become 
shorter and less educated adults compared to their healthy and well-nourished peers. This 
implies that policy interventions after the first five years of life cannot be effective. The 
empirical evidence supporting this view, however, typically originates from data sets that 
follow children only over a short period of time providing an incomplete portrait of 
children’s long-term development patterns. 
In the final essay I study the extent to which short and stunted children are able to recover 
the height losses experienced in early childhood. I use simple statistical theory and the 
1970 British Cohort study to demonstrate methodological flaws in the existing empirical 
literature measuring such catch-up growth. I then go on to document how puberty offers 
an opportunity window for the Kagera children to recover from past nutritional shocks. 
This essay is forthcoming in Annals of Human Biology. 
The structure of this thesis can now be outlined. The next chapter begins with a short 
overview of the macro-economic situation in Tanzania over the survey period. It then 
provides an in-depth description of the Kagera Health and Development survey with a 
particular focus on the latest round of the survey in 2010. The following three chapters 
comprise the essays. Chapter three presents the first essay titled "Risk Sharing and 
Internal Migration" while chapter four contains the second titled "Temperature Shocks, 
Household Consumption and Internal Migration: Evidence from rural Tanzania". The 
fifth chapter provides the third essay titled "Measuring catch-up growth in malnourished 
populations". Chapter six contains some concluding remarks. 
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2 Data and Context  
2.1  Tanzania 1990-2010 
Similar to many other African countries (see Radelet 2010, Young 2012, McKay 2013), 
Tanzania recorded impressive growth rates over the period of study in this thesis. Figure 
2.1 shows that after a period of sluggish growth in early 1990s, the country's GDP per 
capita increased by roughly 50 per cent over the past two decades.  
Figure 2.1: GDP per capita in Tanzania, 1990-2010 (1990 = base year) 
 
Source: own calculations from the World Bank World Development Indicators data 
base (World Bank 2013) 
Although more than two thirds of the Tanzanian working population engage in 
agricultural production (URT 2009), at the macro-level the economy has become less and 
less dependent on agriculture (Lokina et al. 2011). This can be seen in Figure 2.2 that 
shows each sector's contribution to the GDP in 1990, 2000 and 2010. By the latter years, 
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the service sector, owing largely to the growth in tourism, leapfrogged agriculture as the 
largest sector constituting nearly half of Tanzanian GDP in 2010. The share of the 
industrial sector, mainly driven by mining and construction, has nearly doubled in these 
two decades.  
Figure 2.2: Value added as a share of GDP by sector 
 
Source: own calculations from the World Bank World Development Indicators data 
base (World Bank 2013) 
The decline of the agricultural sector is, however, only relative, not absolute. Figure 2.3 
shows that the total value added in agriculture more than doubled in 1999-2010 but the 
other sectors recorded even more impressive growth rates. The value added in the 
industrial sector more than tripled over the 20 years. 
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Figure 2.3: Growth of the value added by sector 
  
Note: these values are not expressed in per capita terms. 
Source: own calculations from the World Bank World Development Indicators data 
base (World Bank 2013).  
These impressive growth figures have not, however, been translated into significant 
poverty reduction. The data from the Household Budget Surveys indicate that although 
the median expenditure per capita doubled between 2000-2007, the population living 
under the basic needs poverty line declined by only three percentage points over the same 
period (URT 2009).1 It seems then that the Tanzanian 'growth miracle' has not been pro-
poor. However, this discrepancy may also be explained by the conceptual differences, 
including the use of different price deflators, between the national accounts and household 
survey data (Atkinson and Lugo 2010).  
                                                 
1 According to the 2007 Household Budget Survey, the percentage of the population living under the basic 
needs poverty line was 39 in 1991/92, 36 in 2000/1 and 33 in 2007  (URT 2009). 
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The quality of African national accounts data has recently been called into question 
(Jerven 2013). 2 However, some non-monetary indicators also provide support to the 
growth story. Figure 2.4 shows that the infant mortality rate has decreased from 100 per 
1,000 live births in 1990 to 42 in 2010. 
Figure 2.4: Infant mortality in 1990-2010 
  
Source: own calculations from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators data base (World Bank 2013) 
 
Finally, these high GDP growth rates accompanied by a declining share of agriculture 
follow the predictions of the early models of structural transformation (Lewis 1954, Ranis 
and Fei 1961) where a country develops by moving away from subsistence agriculture to 
other, more productive, activities. The national accounts data certainly suggest, as also 
                                                 
2 Lipton (2013) provides an insightful (and entertaining) review of Jerven's book and of the 
'Africa's National-accounts Mess'. 
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pointed out by Moyo et al. (2012), that the structural transformation is already underway 
in Tanzania. This, of course, should then take place together with increasing urbanization. 
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the National Bureau of Statistics has not yet released 
the 2012 census information about urbanization rates. The current figures are therefore 
largely based on projections from the growth rates between the previous censuses 
administered in 1988 and 2002. Using these data, the United Nations (2012) estimate that 
the share of the urban population in Tanzania grew from 19 to 26 per cent in 1990-2010. 
2.2 Kagera 
Kagera is a region in the north-western part of Tanzania (see Figure 2.5). A large part of 
Lake Victoria is contained within this region and it shares a border with Burundi, Rwanda, 
and Uganda. Out of all the regions of Tanzania, Kagera is the farthest from Dar es Salaam 
– the commercial capital of the country. 3 The land area consists of roughly 29,000 km2. 
The region is overwhelmingly rural and agricultural production is the most important 
source of income, with more than 80 per cent of the region’s economically active 
population engaged in it (URT 2012). Bananas, beans, maize, and cassava comprise the 
main food crops while coffee, tea, and cotton are important cash crops. Recent years have 
witnessed a rise in improved banana varieties and sugar for use as cash crops. Only two 
per cent of agricultural households reported having access to irrigation in 2007/08 (URT 
2012). Finally, according to the 2012 census, the region has a population of roughly 2.5 
million people (URT 2013). 
 
                                                 
3 The ‘as the crow flies’ distance from the region’s capital (Bukoba) to Dar es Salaam is more than 1,000 
km. 
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Figure 2.5: Kagera on a map 
 
 
source: Google Maps (2013) 
 
 
2.3 Kagera Health and Development Survey 4 
The Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) was originally designed to study 
the economic impact of adult deaths on surviving household members.  This focus was 
motivated by the fact that Kagera is historically a region with a high HIV/AIDS incidence 
                                                 
4 This section builds on and contains passages from a previously published working paper: De Weerdt, 
Joachim, Kathleen Beegle, Helene Bie Lilleør, Stefan Dercon, Kalle Hirvonen, Martina Kirchberger, and 
Sofya Krutikova. 2012. "Kagera Health and Development Survey 2010: Basic Information Document." 
Rockwool Foundation Working Paper Series no. 46. 
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(for details, see Iliffe 2006). The first rounds of the survey were designed and 
implemented by the World Bank and the Muhimbili University College of Health 
Sciences. The survey consisted of 915 households from 51 villages that were interviewed 
up to four times from autumn 1991 to January 1994. Figure 2.6 shows the baseline 
villages on a map. The sample was drawn from a random sample stratified by adult 
mortality rates in the communities and the agro-climatic zones in the region. 5 The World 
Bank (2004) provides a comprehensive description of the baseline survey. 
 Figure 2.6: KHDS baseline villages 
 
source: own construction using GPS Visualizer (2013) 
 
                                                 
5 Comparisons of various welfare indicators with the 1991/92 Tanzanian Household Budget Survey suggest 
that KHDS provides a representative sample for the region during this period (Beegle, De Weerdt and 
Dercon, 2011). 
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The KHDS-2004 survey aimed to re-interview all individuals that were ever interviewed 
in the baseline survey and were alive in 2004. This effectively meant that the original 
household panel survey turned into a panel of individuals. A full household questionnaire 
was administered in a household where a panel respondent was found residing. Due to 
household dynamics, the sample size increased to more than 2,700 households. Excluding 
households for which all previous members were deceased (17 households and 27 
respondents), the KHDS 2004 field team managed to re-contact 93 per cent of the baseline 
households. Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2006) provide a description of this survey 
round.  
2.3.1 Field work for the 2010 round  
The KHDS 2010 was designed to provide data to understand changes in living standards 
of the sample of individuals originally interviewed 16-19 years ago. Similarly to KHDS-
2004, the 2010 round attempted to re-interview all respondents ever interviewed in the 
KHDS 91-94 – irrespective of whether the respondent moved out of the original village, 
region, or country, or was residing in a new household. 
The KHDS 2010 was primarily funded by the Rockwool Foundation and the World Bank, 
with additional funds provided by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation through the 
Agence Inter-établissements de Recherche pour le Développement (AIRD). The project 
was initiated and designed by Kathleen Beegle (Development Research Group, World 
Bank), Helene Bie Lilleør (Rockwool Foundation), Joachim De Weerdt (EDI) and Sonya 
Krutikov (University of Oxford), with crucial inputs from Stefan Dercon (University of 
Oxford), Martina Kirchberger (University of Oxford) and me. Neil Chalmers 
programmed and designed the Electronic Survey (CAPI) application. The field work was 
implemented in 2010 by Economic Development Initiatives (EDI) under the direction of 
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Joachim De Weerdt, with Respichius Mitti and Leonard Kyaruzi forming the coordination 
team and Thaddeus Rweyemamu in charge of data processing. I was advising on survey 
technical issues and questionnaire content during the field work. My other responsibilities 
included ensuring that the data collected met the quality standards required for rigorous 
statistical and econometric analysis.  
Electronic survey methods 
A novel feature of the KHDS 2010 compared to the earlier waves is that data were 
collected using electronic survey questionnaires administered on handheld computers. 
Apart from saving paper, the key advantage of electronic questionnaires is the 
identification of errors and missing fields during the interview.6 In KHDS 2010, most of 
these checks were programmed into the questionnaires from the beginning but many were 
added as the survey progressed based on the feedback from the field and from the data 
processing team. Towards the end of the survey, there were more than 1,400 in-built 
consistency checks in the programme. Before leaving the household, interviewers ran the 
final validation check and resolved any problems directly with the respondent while still 
in the household.  This resulted in extremely clean data with very few coding errors. 
Furthermore, the data were recorded and stored into a relational database with referential 
integrity. As a result, the end user of the data will be able to merge data files with ease 
and there will not be any duplicate entries in the data files. Another advantage of 
electronic questionnaires is the immediate availability of the data. In KHDS 2010, data 
were uploaded from the field to a secure server using GPRS-enabled mobile phone 
networks. A third advantage is that data from previous waves were carried forward to the 
                                                 
6 For a formal analysis of the benefits of computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI), using similar 
software, see Caeyers, Chalmers and De Weerdt (2012). 
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questionnaires providing the opportunity to resolve possible inconsistencies between the 
waves. Finally, the ability to upload data daily provided a range of opportunities to 
improve tracking practices involved in finding panel respondents. In particular, data files 
could be sent across teams located in different areas based on the updated tracking 
information. Furthermore, if the information was not sufficient to track the migrant, the 
data file was sent back to the teams still located in the baseline village or to other location 
for additional tracking information. 
Organization of field work 
The KHDS 2010 field work was managed by Economic Development Initiatives (EDI). 
The project headquarters were the EDI office in Bukoba, Kagera. The Bukoba office was 
responsible for all the contractual and legal matters related to the survey. In addition, 
logistical arrangements as well as the maintenance and storage of the field equipment 
were managed from the office. The next sections provide an overview of the recruitment 
procedures, main field work and tracking.  
Recruitment 
The recruitment for the interviewers and data processing officers started in January 2010. 
The four KHDS supervisors were EDI employees with past survey experience. The 
supervisors were involved in the development and piloting of the survey instrument. They 
also took part in the field work planning and the preparation of the field work manuals. 
The training of 26 interviewers began in February 2010. The training consisted of three 
weeks of class and 10 days of field training. In June, five more interviewers were trained 
and they joined the teams in July. These interviewers had previous survey experience and 
therefore field training consisted of observing other interviewers during real household 
visits. In total, 31 interviewers were employed for the field work. The project also had 
three full time data processing officers based in the headquarters. 
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Main Field Work  
The main field work started in April 2010. It consisted of four teams of 6-8 interviewers 
and each team was led by one supervisor. The main field work was split into two phases. 
In the first phase, the four teams visited all original clusters in districts close to Bukoba. 
The teams visited the households that were still located in the original baseline 
community and also tracked individuals who had moved to nearby villages. 
In the second phase, the teams split up. Two teams visited baseline communities in 
Northern and Southern districts of the region and tracked migrants in these areas. The 
other two teams were sent out to locations outside Kagera to track migrants. The next 
section provides details about the tracking in KHDS 2010. 
Before starting the work in a community, the supervisor arranged a meeting with the 
village chairman and presented the necessary documents such as the research permits. 
The supervisor also arranged accommodation for the field team from the village. 
Households were grouped by the sub-villages and each interviewer was allocated 
questionnaires based on these locations.  
The village chairman and local guides assisted in finding the respondents. The 
interviewers usually agreed on the date and time of the visit with the household 
beforehand. The interviewers completed the household and other questionnaires where 
applicable in one or two visits depending on the size of the household and the number of 
sections and questionnaires that applied to the household. 
Questionnaire checks were done in four stages: 
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 First, before leaving the household, the interviewer ran the final validation check. 
The check went through all pre-written validation rules and alerted the interviewer 
for any errors or missing fields in the questionnaire. 
 Second, in the first months of the field work, the supervisor went through the 
questionnaire with the interviewer and discussed any problematic issues. They 
also provided feedback to the headquarters if question specific instructions or new 
consistency checks were needed. 
 Third, after the supervisor had uploaded the data to the headquarters, the data 
processing team went through each questionnaire. At best, the data was reviewed 
by the data processing team after a day or two of the interview. If the mistakes 
were discovered at this stage, the questionnaire was sent back to the supervisor. 
The supervisor then, depending on the type of problem, consulted the interviewer 
or arranged a revisit to the household. 
 Fourth, the field management checked the overall quality of the data using 
statistical packages and provided feedback to the field teams. 
The quality control was managed by the Data Processing Team. This included direct 
observations during interviews and re-visits to households. During re-visits, the data 
processing officers asked a set of questions from the Household Questionnaire to verify 
the validity of the data. These re-visits also provided an opportunity to correct 
questionnaires and to improve tracking information. 
Tracking  
The tracking phase started in August 2010 when a team of seven interviewers were sent 
to the neighbouring region of Mwanza, nine interviewers were sent to Dar es Salaam and 
one interviewer travelled to Uganda. During the tracking phase, one team of 11 
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interviewers remained in Kagera to visit remaining original baseline communities and 
track individuals based in Kagera. Each team was led by one supervisor. 
In the beginning of October, most of the interviewers were set up to work independently. 
This facilitated fast turnover of the data files and rapid dispatching of interviewers to 
conduct interviews in remote parts of Tanzania. These interviewers were responsible for 
their logistical planning and they transferred data files directly to the headquarters. 
Supervisors were in close communication with these interviewers. 
The main tracking phase ended at the end of October 2010. After that, the field work 
continued for eight weeks with four full time interviewers in Kagera and one part-time 
interviewer in Dar es Salaam. Supervision during this phase was organised from the 
headquarters. This small team was responsible for tracking remaining panel respondents 
and re-visiting households for questionnaire corrections.  
Re-contacting rates 
The re-contact rates in the KHDS 2010 are in line with the ones achieved in KHDS 2004. 
Table 2.1 reports the KHDS 2010 re-contacting rates in terms of the baseline households. 
Excluding the households in which all panel respondents were deceased, 92 per cent of 
the households were re-contacted.  
Although KHDS is a panel of individuals and the definition of a household loses meaning 
after 10-19 years, it is common in panel surveys to consider re-contact rates in terms of 
households. Taking into account the long, 10 or 16 year periods between surveys, the 
attrition rates in KHDS-2004 and KHDS-2010 are extremely low by the standards of such 
panels (Alderman et al. 2001). 
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As in KHDS 2004, households that were interviewed four times at the baseline were more 
likely to be found in 2010. Excluding the households in which all members had died, 95 
per cent of these households were re-interviewed in 2010. 
 
Table 2.1: KHDS 2010 re-interview rates in terms of households 
 
Number of 
interviews during 
1991-1994 Re-interviewed Deceased Untraced Total 
1 22 4 15 41 
  54% 10% 37%   
2 36 2 8 46 
  78% 4% 17%   
3 54 2 13 69 
  78% 3% 19%   
4 706 18 35 759 
  93% 2% 5%   
Overall 818 26 71 915 
  89% 3% 8%   
Notes: "Re-interviewed" means that at least one member of the baseline 
household was re-interviewed. "Deceased" means that all Previous 
Household Members are reported to be dead. "Untraced" means that no 
Previous Household Member was re-interviewed. 
 
The KHDS 2010 re-contact rates in terms of panel respondents are provided in Table 2.2. 
The older respondents, if alive, were much more likely to be re-contacted than younger 
respondents. In the oldest age category, 60 years and older at the baseline, the interview 
teams managed to re-contact almost 98 per cent of all survivors. The length of the KHDS 
survey is evident in this age category, however, as almost three quarters of the 
respondents had passed away by 2010. 
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Table 2.3 provides the KHDS 2010 re-contact rates by location. More than 50 per cent of 
the re-interviewed panel respondents were located in the same community as in KHDS 
91-94. Nearly 14 per cent of the re-contacted respondents were found in regions other 
than Kagera. The survey team also tracked panel respondents in Uganda where one per 
cent of the interviewed panel respondents were located. The location of the untraced 
respondents is based on the tracking data. More than half of the untraced respondents are 
reported to be living in Kagera. 
Table 2.2: KHDS 2010 re-interview rates in terms of individuals 
Age at 
baseline 
1991-1994 Re-interviewed Deceased Untraced 
Re-interview 
rate among 
survivors 
<10 years 1403 173 276 84% 
  76% 9% 15%   
10-19 years 1523 176 284 84% 
  77% 9% 14%   
20-39 years 891 369 149 86% 
  63% 26% 11%   
40-59 years 397 205 30 93% 
  63% 32% 5%   
60+ years 122 352 3 98% 
  26% 74% 1%   
Overall 4336 1275 742 85% 
  68% 20% 12%   
Notes: Sample of individuals interviewed in KHDS 91-94. Age categories 
are based on age at first interview. "Re-interviewed" means that the 
person was found and was re-interviewed. "Untraced" means that the 
person was not found or refused to be re-interviewed. 
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Table 2.3: KHDS 2010 re-contact rates by location 
 Number Location % 
Baseline sample 6,353   
Re-interviewed 4,336   
  Same community 52 
  Nearby village 9 
  Elsewhere in Kagera 24 
  Other region 14 
  Ugandaa 1 
    Untraced 742   
  Kagera 53 
  Dar es Salaam 9 
  Mwanza 9 
  Other region 10 
  Other countryb 8 
  Not known 11 
    Deceased 1,275   
Notes: Location for untraced respondents is reported by other household members 
from the baseline survey who were successfully located, interviewed, and able to 
provide location information on the respondent. In some cases, this information 
comes from other relatives or neighbours residing in the baseline communities. 
a. KHDS 2010 tracked international migrants in Uganda only.  
b. Countries to which the 58 untraced respondents had moved are: Burundi, 
Denmark, Kenya, Norway, Rwanda, South-Africa, Sweden, UK and USA. 
 
2.4 What makes these data special? 
In terms of length, there are only a few other comparable African household panels. The 
Ethiopian Rural Household Survey covers a 20-year period spanning 1989-2009. Initially, 
in 1989, the study included six rural villages in Central and Southern Ethiopia. In 1994, 
the survey added nine more villages from other parts of the country. This increased the 
sample size from 450 to 1,500 households. The latest round in 2009 also included a 
tracking survey that followed migrants from the 2004 round. Another long panel comes 
from Zimbabwe where Dr Bill Kinsey with his colleagues has been following 400 
households over a 17-year period. Surveys were conducted in 1983, 1987 and on an 
annual basis from 1992 to 2000. The last round of the survey in 2000 included a tracking 
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mode with the aim of tracing children who were under three years of age during the 1982-
84 droughts. Unfortunately, this data set is not publicly available. Finally, the KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) from South-Africa covers a 10-year period (1993-
2004). 7  
Apart from the nearly unparalleled length of the survey in Sub-Saharan African context, 
KHDS has a number of qualities that makes it particularly suited for investigating the 
research questions set out in this thesis.  
The data set is ideal for migration analysis. The tracking feature of the survey means that 
we have rich information about the migrants, including information about their living 
standards. In Chapter 3, with Joachim De Weerdt, we document how migrants have 
grown much richer than those who remained in villages were they were first interviewed 
during the baseline survey in 1991-94. This implies, as discussed in Beegle, De Weerdt, 
and Dercon (2011), that had we not tracked migrants we would have seriously 
underestimated improvements in living standards using this panel sample. In Chapter 3, 
we exploit the fact that household dynamics over this long period has created extended 
family networks that have been dispersed into different parts of Tanzania and Uganda. 
This analysis would not have been possible without the great effort we put into tracking 
the panel respondents in 2010. 
The 2010 round collected extensive information about the migration histories since the 
baseline survey in 1991-94. Among other things, these data provide the year when the 
migrant first left his/her baseline village. I exploit this information to develop a time-
event history model to study how migration decisions respond to temperature changes. 
                                                 
7 There are also a few exciting cohort studies. For example, the Young Lives Study tracks two cohorts of 
children in Ethiopia for a 15-year period (2002-2016).  
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Furthermore, the baseline data allow me to control for various household and individual 
level characteristics prior to migration.  
We also recorded the GPS coordinates for each interviewed household. An external GPS 
device, linked to the CAPI application through a Bluetooth connection, took 
approximately 10 GPS readings per household. The average of these readings was 
computed and linked to the household level file. These steps ensured that the GPS data 
are unlikely to contain errors. In Chapter 4, I use these high-quality GPS data to link 
baseline villages to historical temperature and rainfall records from external data sources. 
Finally, collecting anthropometric data from all adults and children older than five years 
is surprisingly rare (see e.g. Moradi 2010). For example, the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) collect anthropometric data only from children under five and from 
women aged 15-49. In the third essay, this feature of the survey performs a  central role 
as I document how children in puberty experience considerable catch-up growth in height.   
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3 Essay 1: Risk Sharing and Internal 
Migration 
Joint work with Joachim De Weerdt 
 
3.1  Introduction 
If, in the next decades, Africa catches up with the rest of the world, then that will almost 
certainly coincide with intergenerational mobility out of rural into urban areas and out of 
agriculture into non-agricultural activities (Lewis 1954, Harris and Todaro 1970). 
Historically, in both rich developed countries and fast-growing developing countries, this 
type of migration has moved in lockstep with development and poverty reduction (Collier 
and Dercon 2009). Recently, China’s urban population officially surpassed its rural one: 
of China’s 1.35 billion people, 51 per cent lived in urban areas at the end of 2011, rising 
from less than 20 per cent in 1980 (UN, 2012). Furthermore, UNDP (2009) reports that 
of the one billion migrants worldwide, three-quarters are internal migrants. With 
international migration open to relatively few Africans, we should expect massive internal 
migration to form a core part of the development process.  
The scale of this demographic process is captured in the data that form the empirical basis 
of this essay, further motivating our focus on internal migration. These data are part of an 
exceptional panel data set from the Kagera region in Tanzania, spanning nearly two 
decades of migration and development. The 2010 follow-up survey attempted to trace all 
6,353 individuals listed on the baseline 1991/94 household rosters and re-interview them 
irrespective of their location. Once we exclude the 1,275 individuals who had died by 
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2010, we are left with 4,996 baseline individuals whose 2010 locations are known.8 Of 
those, 45 per cent were found residing in the baseline village, 53 per cent had migrated 
within the country, two per cent to another East African country (primarily Uganda), and 
0.3 per cent had moved outside of East Africa. This region – not atypical of remote rural 
Africa – is clearly on the move, with internal migration dwarfing international migration.  
We attempt to understand how this powerful current of internal migration, which is part 
and parcel of the modernization process, interacts with a traditional institution like 
informal risk-sharing to shape economic mobility and vulnerability. This is a key question 
because, as Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006, p. 1230) put it  
[...] a complete understanding of the development process must not only take 
account of the initial conditions and the role of existing institutions in shaping the 
response to modernization and globalization, but must also consider how these 
traditional institutions are shaped in turn by the forces of change. 
Geographical mobility in rural Tanzania is associated with large income gains. Our data 
show that despite only minor welfare differences during the 1991-94 baseline survey, 
those who moved out of the region to other parts of Tanzania have grown roughly twice 
as rich as those who did not by the time they were interviewed again nearly two decades 
later. As we are measuring consumption and not income, it is clear that the main 
beneficiaries of this migration-led growth were the migrants themselves and certainly not 
their relatives who remained at home.  
                                                 
8 We lack location information on 82 individuals. Because this is after multiple attempts through various 
sources it is unlikely that these individuals have moved outside of East Africa. Information on such an 
important, low-occurrence event is unlikely to be hidden.  
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But did these migrants simply leave and never look back, or did they maintain links with 
the home community? We investigate this question by exploiting the fact that the 3,314 
households interviewed in 2010 are grouped in 817 geographically dispersed extended 
family networks. Using techniques from the risk-sharing literature, we quantify how 
migrants’ consumption responds to shocks experienced by others in their extended family 
network. Much of the migration literature has a very strong focus on dealing with the 
selectivity of the migration decision. Interestingly, in this essay, the endogeneity of 
migration turns out to be irrelevant for our most important contribution: the 
documentation of the long-run dynamics of risk-sharing arrangements among extended 
family members in a context of large internal migration flows. Whether or not migration 
is causally responsible for any of our findings is an interesting, but secondary question, 
which we will nevertheless attempt to address in Section 3.8.  
Our analysis departs from a number of other studies in the migration literature by focusing 
on consumption instead of transfers. This choice of the outcome variable is motivated by 
the fact that risk sharing and other economic exchange could occur through a multitude 
of different mechanisms, of which transfers is just one. Other mechanisms could include 
looking for a job for someone, employing them directly, providing them with tips, advice 
or a network link, or providing migration opportunities (Munshi 2003). By analyzing 
consumption we focus on the joint and final effect of all such mechanisms. 
The observed divergence between migrants and non-migrants in these data also persists 
within extended family networks (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2011), which violates 
the full risk-sharing hypothesis (Townsend 1994), and does not support the notion that 
migration is the result of a household level maximization strategy (Stark and Bloom 1985, 
Rosenzweig and Stark 1989, Grimard 1997). It could, however, be consistent with other 
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reciprocity-based models (e.g. limited commitment, moral hazard, or hidden income) that 
permit the co-existence of divergent consumption growth and risk sharing. In our 
empirical analysis, we find that migrants are affected by shocks to others in the network 
whereas non-migrants are not. Such unilateral insurance leads us to reject the reciprocity-
based risk-sharing models. 
One explanation for this observed lack of reciprocity could be that migrants insure non-
migrants in exchange for other benefits (Lucas and Stark 1985, Hoddinott 1994). These 
benefits could accrue to the migrant later in life and outside the purview of our survey 
data. We consider, but reject a number of such longer-run transactional motives for the 
observed unilateral insurance. The results are, however, very much in line with findings 
from the diverse literature on social norms (Platteau 2000, Cox and Fafchamps 2007, 
Burke and Young 2011), where those who move ahead remain obligated to their extended 
family in the home community. 
Our results speak to an emerging literature that worries about home communities 
imposing a stifling ‘kin-tax’ on the upwardly mobile. Baland, Guirkinger, and Mali 
(2011) show how people take out costly loans in order to conceal their income, while 
Platteau (2012) sees migration as a means to escape the implied prying eyes and incessant 
demands of the kinship group. The kinship poverty trap model of Hoff and Sen (2006) 
predicts possible resistance from the home communities as they feel threatened by 
productive forces leaving and severing links with home to escape taxing demands for 
assistance. Anticipating this, the home community may set up subtle exit barriers, which 
could lead to below-optimal levels of migration. Jakiela and Ozier (2012) report 
laboratory evidence from Kenya that women feel obliged to share four to eight per cent 
of the income gains realized in the experiment. In our sample, Tanzanian migrants 
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sacrifice 2.9 to 5.0 percentage points out of a total growth of 108 per cent to insure their 
relatives. This estimate is equivalent to a ‘tax’ of 2.7 to 4.6 per cent. We regard this tax 
rate as too trivial to exert any constraining effect on migrants. 
After describing the model, the data and the estimation strategy in the next three sections, 
we discuss the results in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 tackles the issue of longer-run 
transactional motives. In Section 3.7 we calculate the cost of this insurance provision. 
Section 3.8 discusses the endogeneity of migration and Section 3.9 contains some further 
robustness checks. Section 3.10 provides a concluding discussion.  
3.2 Risk sharing in theory 9 
The full risk-sharing hypothesis is based on the idea that the network acts as if it was a 
single household that maximized utility subject to a joint budget constraint. The model 
predicts that incomes are completely pooled (according to predetermined weights) and all 
idiosyncratic income shocks are smoothed through the network (e.g. Altonji, Hayashi, 
and Kotlikoff 1992, Townsend 1994). 
In a simple two-household extended family network, both households derive utility from 
consumption: 𝑣(𝑐). Insurance and credit markets are missing, and income (𝑦𝑠) is 
uncertain and depends on the state of the world (𝑠).  10 We assume that households live 
infinitely. 11  
                                                 
9 We thank Stefan Dercon who alerted us to the attractiveness of contrasting full and partial insurance 
concepts through Equations (3.1) and (3.4). 
10 To simplify notation, we abstract away savings. This does not affect the main predictions of the model 
(see, for example, Ligon, 1998 for a characterisation of the full risk sharing model with savings). However, 
the ability to save may exacerbate the efficiency problems if the key assumptions listed below do not hold 
(see Ligon, 1998; Chandrasekhar, Kinnan and Larreguy, 2012). 
11 If the time frame is finite, in the absence of altruism, households would not have any incentive for risk 
sharing in the final period, and as result in T-1, T-2, etc. The assumption of an infinite time frame holds if 
the new household head inherits from the previous head and maintains the risk sharing contract with same 
households. See Fafchamps (1992) for an alternative justification for this assumption. 
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Assuming that households maximize a well behaving utility function 12, the standard 
utility maximization problem yields a following first order condition: 
(3.1)  
𝑢′[𝑐1(𝑦)]
𝑢′[𝑐2(𝑦)]
= 𝜆 =
𝜔2 
𝜔1 
 ,  
where 𝜆, the Lagrange multiplier, is the marginal utility of income. According to Equation 
(3.1), households equate their marginal utilities of consumption in all states of the world. 
The allocation depends on the Pareto weights 𝜔1 and 𝜔2  that are determined by the 
extended family. 
If utility functions follow a constant relative risk aversion function: 𝑢(𝑐) =
𝑐1−𝜓
1−𝜓
, where 
𝜓 is a measure of risk aversion 13, the first order conditions for household 𝑖 at time 𝑡 become:  
𝜔𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡(𝑦)
−𝜓 − 𝜆 = 0. Equating these conditions for the two households, taking logarithms 
and re-arranging yields:  
(3.2) ∆ ln 𝑐1 (𝑦) = ∆ ln 𝑐2 (𝑦).  
Equation (3.2) implies that if full risk sharing takes place, we should not expect to see 
households within the same extended family growing at different rates. Furthermore, 
assuming that there are no frictions between the households in the extended family, the 
model predicts that all idiosyncratic shocks experienced by households are completely 
smoothed through the extended family. These two predictions form the basis for our test 
– and rejection of the full risk-sharing model. First, the descriptive statistics in Section 
                                                 
12 The utility function is inter-temporally separable, strictly increasing but concave (𝑣′ > 0 & 𝑣′′ < 0). 
13 We assume that the risk preferences within the networks are identical. The implications of this assumption 
are discussed in Section 3.4. 
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3.3 confirm highly unequal consumption growth between migrants and non-migrants. 
Second, in Section 3.5 we show that after controlling for extended family fixed effects, 
household consumption growth remains responsive to idiosyncratic income shocks.  
The rejection of full risk sharing is neither novel nor surprising and emerged as an 
empirically established stylized fact early on within this strand of literature, being valid 
across a variety of different contexts (e.g. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1992, 
Townsend 1994, Grimard 1997). Most studies, however, find that at least some degree of 
insurance takes place and explain this theoretically by adding additional constraints 
(relating to the failure of assumptions regarding perfect information and full commitment) 
to the full risk-sharing model. We will discuss each of these constraints in turn, but point 
out that an important common feature across all these augmented models is that, if the 
risk-sharing contract survives, the ratios of marginal utilities become state contingent and 
are, therefore, no longer constant over time. This could allow the share of some members 
(migrants in our case) to increase over time. 
In the presence of enforcement problems, the better-off households have an incentive to 
leave the arrangement and live in autarky. The limited commitment model (e.g. Coate 
and Ravallion 1993, Attanasio and Ríos-Rull 2000, Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2002, 
Kinnan 2012) augments the full risk-sharing model with participation constraints (one for 
each household): 
(3.3) ∑ 𝛽𝑡 ∑ 𝜋(𝑦𝑠){𝑣1[𝑐1𝑡(𝑦𝑠)]}
𝑆
𝑠=1
∞
𝑡=1
 ≥ u𝐴 ,  
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where u𝐴 is the expected utility received in autarky, 𝛽 is the discount rate and 𝜋 is the 
probability attached to the state of the world 𝑠. Solving the augmented maximization 
problem yields a following first-order condition: 
(3.4)  
𝑢′[𝑐1(𝑦)]
𝑢′[𝑐2(𝑦)]
=
𝜔2 + ∑  𝜇2(𝑦𝑠)
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝜔1 + ∑  𝜇1(𝑦𝑠)
𝑆
𝑠=1
  .  
where 𝜇1 and  𝜇2 are the Lagrange multipliers attached to the participation constraints. 
Now, as can be seen from Equation (3.4), if the participation constraints bind, the ratio of 
marginal utilities becomes state contingent. In the context of migration, a growth 
premium has to be granted to the migrant whose autarky options have improved. As a 
result, risk sharing is no longer efficient: the impact of idiosyncratic income shocks is not 
equally shared within the extended family network.  
The other frictions have similar analytical consequences. If households cannot monitor 
other network members, the problem of free riding emerges. In moral hazard models (Lim 
and Townsend 1998, Kinnan 2012), the full risk-sharing model is augmented with 
incentive-compatibility constraints. The ex ante information asymmetry leaves the 
extended family to balance effort and insurance. Migrants are motivated to exert effort 
by rewarding them with higher consumption. This comes with an efficiency cost: 
idiosyncratic shocks are not completely smoothed within the network. Finally, if there is 
imperfect information about the realized incomes, households may have an incentive to 
misreport their incomes to avoid payments or even claim transfers from other households. 
In hidden income models (Townsend 1982, Fafchamps 1992, Kinnan 2012), the 
maximization problem is augmented with truth-telling constraints that require that 
households will not gain from misreporting. To encourage truthful reporting, migrants 
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are allowed to enjoy a larger share of the consumption cake. As a consequence, Pareto-
efficient risk sharing is again sacrificed. 
These frictions can have important implications for the degree of risk sharing. 14 
Distinguishing which of the three models of constrained insurance explains our data best 
is beyond the scope of this essay. 15 One common feature, however, is that despite friction, 
reciprocity remains intact: households engage in reciprocal risk sharing but the degree of 
its efficiency varies. In Section 3.5, we study the existence of such reciprocal but partial 
risk-sharing arrangements by testing whether households are responsive to income shocks 
faced by other households in the same extended family network.  
In this essay, we contrast these reciprocity-based models with those that take into account 
social norms. Redistributive values may have been instilled since childhood and carefully 
nurtured through oral transmission, rituals and ceremonies in which the importance of the 
kinship group is strongly emphasized (Lévi-Strauss 1969). Remittances and other forms 
of assistance may also buy social prestige, political power or serve to perpetuate 
subordination (Platteau 2012, Platteau and Sekeris 2010). In the risk-sharing literature, 
social norms have been seen as the glue that keeps the risk-sharing contract from breaking 
apart by alleviating enforcement and information problems (Stark and Lucas 1988, 
Fafchamps 1999, Foster and Rosenzweig 2001). Theoretically this can be modeled as 
subjective satisfaction that individuals receive from participation. 16 The satisfaction can 
stem from the fulfillment of obligations and the avoidance of social sanctions, such as 
                                                 
14 For example, Chandrasekhar, Kinnan and Larreguy (2011, 2012), using field experiments from Southern 
India find that limited commitment reduces transfers by 10 per cent and hidden income by 40 per cent. 
15 See Kinnan (2012) for such an exercise with data from rural Thailand. 
16 In the context of limited commitment, we can re-write the right-hand side of Equation (3.3) as u𝐴 − 𝐴, 
where 𝐴 captures such satisfaction (Fafchamps, 1999; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; De Weerdt and 
Fafchamps, 2011). 
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guilt, shame or ridicule, or fear of witchcraft. It can also include altruism, which we do 
not attempt to distinguish from social norms. 
A recent empirical literature relying on experimental design highlights the importance of 
these forces. Chandrasekhar, Kinnan and Larreguy (2011, 2012) find that in the presence 
of hidden income and limited commitment, social proximity between the risk-sharing 
partners increases the amounts transferred. The field experiments of Leider et al. (2009) 
and Ligon and Schechter (2012) show that altruism is more important than repeated 
interaction in determining the size of the transfer. Furthermore, social norms could 
weaken the constraints to risk sharing to the extent that they never bind and allow for the 
existence of sustained, unreciprocated transfers.  17 Below we will find evidence of such 
unilateral relations and argue that this is consistent with risk sharing motivated by social 
norms.   
3.3 Data and descriptive analysis 
This essay exploits the fact that the 2010 round of the survey includes all tracked split-
offs from the original household and contains particularly rich information on the current 
links between them. The 2010 sample contains 3,314 households, originating from 816 
initial households. The average baseline household spawned 4.1 households by 2010, out 
of which 1.8 were non-migrant and 2.3 were migrant households. Approximately three 
per cent of the initial households (99 households) did not have any split-offs. In what 
follows we will refer to these networks as extended family networks.      
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of migration patterns. By 2010 nearly 45 per cent of the 
households were still residing in their original baseline community. We define migrants 
                                                 
17 Schechter and Yuskavage (2011) empirically document unreciprocated relations in Paraguay. 
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as households that in 2010 are not located in the original village but were found in a 
nearby village, elsewhere within Kagera or outside Kagera. 18 
Figure 3.1: KHDS-2010 – Re-contacting after 16+ years 
 
These internal migration flows are associated with structural transformation in our data.19 
Table 3.1 shows that out of the 1,850 migrant households, only one-third reported 
agriculture as their main-income generating activity. For the 1,460 non-migrant 
households this is nearly 65 per cent. More than 25 per cent of the migrant households 
engage in informal or formal wage employment and 11 per cent are self-employed (non-
agriculture). These income generating activities differ across locations. Migrants who 
move farther from the baseline village are also less likely to engage in agriculture and 
more likely to be in wage employment. Finally, only a handful of migrants residing in 
urban areas (cities, in district or regional capitals) report agriculture as their main income 
generating activity. These differences in the income portfolios between migrants and non-
                                                 
18 Our results are robust to alternative migrant definitions, such as also defining households that moved to 
a nearby village as non-migrant households.  
19 This is also documented by Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Todo (2013) who use the same data to study 
the role of urbanization and diversification in poverty reduction. 
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migrants provide scope for mutually beneficial risk sharing arrangement since there is 
less likely to be strong co-movement of incomes between the two parties. 20  
Table 3.1: Main income generating activity by migrant status 
 non-
migrant 
HHs 
migrant HHs 
 All 
nearby 
village 
elsewhere 
in Kagera 
outside 
Kagera 
rural urban 
 % % % % % % % 
agriculture 64.9 33.0 51.3 41.9 8.5 54.5 6.5 
fishing 1.8 1.7 0.6 2.6 0.9 2.4 0.8 
trading 11.7 17.2 17.2 15.1 20.7 14.7 20.4 
wage employment 6.2 26.8 12.0 20.1 45.8 13.1 43.6 
transfers & savings 1.2 2.5 1.8 1.4 4.6 0.5 5.0 
self-employed 8.8 11.2 10.5 9.5 14.4 7.1 16.4 
casual labour 5.5 7.6 6.7 9.5 5.3 7.8 7.4 
number of HHs 1,460 1,850 343 917 590 1,021 829 
Note: Agriculture category includes farming and livestock keeping, trading includes agriculture 
and non-agricultural trading. Wage employment can be either in formal or informal employment. 
Transfers include pensions, remittances and rental income. Self-employed category only 
considers self-employment outside agriculture. The information is missing for 2 non-migrant and 
5 migrant households. 
 
Remittances offer one possible medium for risk sharing between households Table 3.2 
provides a summary of the average remittance flows over the past 12 months in 2010 
between the migrant households and households living in or near their baseline villages. 
While non-migrant households were net receivers of remittances, Table 3.2 shows that 
transfers flow both ways. This could lead one to think – mistakenly as the analysis below 
reveals – that these are relationships of reciprocal risk sharing. The data in Table 3.2 are 
self-reported and it is interesting to note that migrants claim to send more home than non-
                                                 
20 Strong correlation of income shocks between migrants and non-migrants would be problematic to our 
econometric analysis. In Section 3.5 we note that the intra-class correlation of shocks in the networks is 
close to zero. 
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migrants acknowledge. A similar discrepancy does not exist in migrant-migrant or stayer-
stayer dyads 21.  
Table 3.3 provides an overview of the reasons for leaving the baseline village. More than 
one-third of the female respondents but none of the male respondents cited marriage as 
the reason for migrating, which is what one would expect in a culture with patrilocal 
marriages. Less than 15 per cent of the female respondents reported that they left because 
of work. In contrast, almost 45 per cent of the male migrants reported to have moved 
because they had found work or went looking for work. Despite these differences in 
migration motives across the two gender groups, we do not find any statistically 
significant differences in risk sharing between male and female migrants (see Appendix 
A). 
Table 3.2: Reported remittances in and out between migrants and non-
migrants 
Dyad gifts out gifts in net in 
stayer-migrant 8,920 13,577 4,656 
migrant-stayer 19,044 10,567 -8,477 
stayer-stayer 8,310 10,476 2,167 
migrant-migrant 17,096 14,816 -2,280 
Total 13,208 12,328 -880 
Note: The table gives the amount of transfers as reported by 
the first half of the dyad with respect to transfers to (first 
column) or from (second column) the second half of the dyad. 
This data are based on self-reported remittance flows in 
households in the past 12 months in 2010. 
 
 
  
                                                 
21 By 'dyad' we refer to a pair of households. 
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Table 3.3: Reasons for leaving the baseline village 
Reason males (%) females (%) 
To look for work 29.8 7.5 
Own schooling 16.0 10.3 
Found work 15.1 6.7 
To live in a healthier environment 10.4 11.7 
Marriage 0.0 38.9 
Other reason 28.7 24.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
The consumption data originate from extensive food and non-food consumption modules 
in the survey, carefully designed to maintain comparability across survey rounds and 
controlling for seasonality. The aggregates are temporally and spatially deflated using 
data from a price questionnaire included in the survey. Consumption is expressed in 
annual per capita terms using 2010 Tanzanian shillings. 22 
Table 3.4 provides the summary of the consumption and poverty developments of the 
panel respondents with respect to their 2010 location. On average, consumption levels in 
the sample almost doubled over 19 years. Individuals who stayed in their community saw 
their consumption increase by more than 40 per cent. Consumption growth for migrants 
was much higher: those who left Kagera saw their consumption nearly triple over the 
same two decades. The poverty statistics tell the same story: nearly all respondents who 
left the region managed to escape poverty, while poverty reduction among non-migrants 
was more modest. These descriptive statistics reinforce the results reported in Beegle, De 
Weerdt, and Dercon (2011): individuals who moved did considerably better than those 
who decided to stay. 
  
                                                 
22 Using adult equivalent units as the denominator instead of household size produces almost identical 
results across all specifications. 
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Table 3.4: Consumption and poverty movements of the panel respondents in 
1991-2010 by 2010 location 
  mean 91   mean 2010   Δ in means   N 
Consumption per capita (Tsh) by 2010 location 
Within community 343,718 492,398 148,680*** 2,224 
Nearby community 364,099 569,438 205,339*** 382 
Elsewhere in Kagera 357,930 695,951 338,021*** 1,007 
Out of Kagera 389,379 1,110,827 721,449*** 658 
Full Sample 355,926 642,558 286,632*** 4,271 
   
Consumption Poverty Head Count (%) by 2010 location 
Within community 31 19 -13*** 2,224 
Nearby community 30 20 -10*** 382 
Elsewhere in Kagera 31 16 -15*** 1,007 
Out of Kagera 23 3 -21*** 658 
Full Sample 30 16 -14*** 4,271 
Note: All consumption values are in annual per capita terms and expressed in 
2010 Tanzanian shillings. Significance of the difference in means using a paired 
t-test; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
After moving, migrants remain linked to extended family members at home: 90 per cent 
of the migrants report that they communicated with a non-migrant network member in 
the 12 months preceding the survey. Migrants who maintained some form of 
communication experienced an average consumption growth of 110 per cent, while those 
who did not grew by 88 per cent. 23 This difference is statistically significant at the one 
per cent level. The severing of the most basic links does not seem to be associated with 
higher consumption growth – if anything, the reverse is true.  
We use data from shock modules administered in 2004 and 2010. During both of these 
rounds, the panel respondents were asked to consider each year between the survey 
rounds and indicate whether a particular year was, in economic terms, 'Very good', 'Good', 
                                                 
23 The mean consumption growth among those who maintained contact was 394,679 Tsh and among those 
who severed links 286,991 Tsh. 
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'Normal', 'Bad', 'Very bad'. For each 'Very bad' response, the respondents were asked to 
provide the main reason for the hardship. We consider each 'Very bad' response as an 
economic shock. More than 60 per cent of the panel respondents reported experiencing at 
least one such shock between 1994 and 2009.  
Table 3.5 provides an overview of the shocks experienced. Most frequently reported 
economic shocks were death of a family member, serious illness, and a poor harvest due 
to bad weather.  
 
Table 3.5: Shocks reported by the panel respondents 1994-2009 
Type of shock Freq. Percentage 
Death of family member 797 26% 
Poor harvest due to adverse weather 638 21% 
Serious illness 577 19% 
Loss in wage employment 219 7% 
Loss of assets 205 7% 
Eviction/resettlement 99 3% 
Poor harvest due to pests or crop diseases 98 3% 
Low crop prices 85 3% 
Loss in off-farm employment 78 3% 
Low income due to lower remittances 43 1% 
Loss of livestock 6 0.2% 
Loss of gifts and support by organizations 4 0.13% 
Other reasons 172 6% 
Total 3,021 100% 
 
The shock data were collected at the individual level – in particular for each person on 
the 2010 roster who also appears on the original 1991/94 rosters. Since our focus is to 
examine the role of shocks on household consumption, the data had to be reformatted 
from the individual to the household level. 24 If at least one individual in the household 
                                                 
24 We repeated the complete analysis of the following sections using individual level data and find it does 
not change the conclusions.   
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reported to have experienced a shock, we interpret it as a household level shock. We 
should also exclude shocks that occurred before the households split. Fortunately, we 
know the year in which the respondents moved to their 2010 location, allowing us to 
include only shocks that occurred at least one year after this move. 25 
Furthermore, some of the shock categories are problematic to our network analysis. 
Mortality shocks may trigger inheritance flows within extended families. As such, a 
negative shock in one household may actually be a positive income shock in another 
household. A similar problem arises with the loss of remittance shocks, if these capture 
the loss of transfers from a household within the same extended family. We therefore 
exclude these two shock categories from our final shock variable. 
Another concern is that because of the self-reported nature of the shock variable uninsured 
shocks may go unreported or reports may differ along unobserved characteristics. To 
address this, in Section 3.7, we extend our analysis with an alternative shock measure 
based on historical rainfall data collected from 212 weather stations in Kagera and the 
migration destinations of our panel respondents.   
Finally, there are 439 households that belong to a network that contains only non-migrants 
or only migrants. As our interest lies in the role of migration in risk sharing, we cannot 
use these households for empirical identification for risk sharing between migrant and 
non-migrant households. These households are therefore dropped from the final sample. 
Table 3.6 presents the summary statistics for the final sample of 2,349 households by 
2010 migration status.  
                                                 
25 This means that for households that remained in the baseline village we consider shocks that took place 
between 1994 and 2009. An alternative strategy would be to only use shocks that occurred after these 
household lived with any other network household member. Applying this strategy does not, however, 
change the conclusions of this chapter.  
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Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics 
 
Migrant households 
Non-migrant 
households 
 mean std dev mean std dev 
1991 household per capita consumption 355,038 193,321 344,095 188,122 
2010 household per capita consumption 739,033 634,925 488,830 358,197 
per capita consumption growth in 1991-2010 383,995 643,235 144,736 352,247 
natural log of per capita consumption growth in 
1991-2010 
0.5754 0.793 0.2944 0.618 
own shock 0.2102 0.408 0.5320 0.499 
# of hhs that reported a shock in the network 0.7937 1.120 1.4467 1.322 
2010 household characteristics : 
age of oldest PHHM in the 2010 hh 31.376 11.132 44.405 18.288 
a PHHM is head of this 2010 hh 0.4094 0.492 0.8100 0.392 
a PHHM is spouse of this 2010 hh's head 0.4528 0.498 0.3058 0.461 
a PHHM is child of this 2010 hh's head 0.0559 0.230 0.2067 0.405 
divorced PHHM in 2010 hh 0.0433 0.204 0.0556 0.229 
a widowed PHHM in 2010 hh 0.0417 0.200 0.1881 0.391 
a married PHHM in 2010 hh 0.6614 0.473 0.6942 0.461 
max yrs edu of PHHM in this 2010 hh 6.7811 3.083 6.1696 2.945 
number of PHHMs in this 2010 hh 1.1024 0.419 1.5681 1.021 
household size in 2010 hh 4.4732 2.450 4.8406 2.322 
hh size in aeu in 2010 hh 3.5236 1.939 3.8314 1.878 
Initial household characteristics:  
natural log value of assets 13.7058 1.100 13.7210 1.061 
Educ of hh head 4.4189 3.139 4.2132 2.979 
head was male 0.7646 0.424 0.7850 0.411 
Age of hh head 48.9764 15.697 48.9296 15.599 
age of head squared 2,645 1,596 2,637 1,575 
Males 0-5 years 0.7622 0.896 0.7090 0.875 
Males 6-15 years 1.3283 1.188 1.3040 1.123 
Males 16-60 years 1.3756 1.022 1.4365 1.059 
Males 61+ years 0.1913 0.394 0.2048 0.404 
Females 0-5 years 0.8386 0.959 0.7609 0.877 
Females 6-15 years 1.4591 1.340 1.3661 1.246 
Females 16-60 years 1.8929 1.320 1.7822 1.186 
Females 61+ years 0.2236 0.446 0.1937 0.407 
hh had a non-earth floor in 1991 0.1811 0.385 0.1455 0.353 
Observations 1,270  1,079  
Note: PHHM refers to previous household member (i.e. person interviewed at the baseline). 
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3.4 Econometric strategy 
We begin the econometric analysis by testing the full risk-sharing hypothesis for those 
extended family networks that contain both migrant and non-migrant households. The 
difference in logged per capita consumption between 2010 and the baseline (∆ ln 𝑐𝑖𝑗) for 
household 𝑖 in extended family 𝑗 is formally modeled as: 
(3.5) ∆ ln 𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛾 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  ,  
where 𝑠𝑖𝑗 has a value 1 if the household experienced a shock in 1994-2009, or if a migrant 
household, after migrating to its current location. The term 𝑥𝑖𝑗 represents a vector of 
household characteristics in 2010 capturing the characteristics of the previous household 
members 26 such as the number of previous household members in the 2010 household, 
the age of the oldest and the education (in years) of the most educated previous household 
members in the household. We also include dummies capturing their relationship to the 
2010 household head and their marital status. 27 The term 𝛼𝑗 represents the network fixed 
effect and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the error term. The inclusion of the network fixed effects means that we 
compare the impact of shocks between the households originating from the same initial 
household. As such, the full risk-sharing model presented earlier requires that β =0. 
The rejection of the full risk-sharing model using Equation (3.5) implies either that the 
risk-sharing arrangement is not efficient – or that the network does not engage in risk 
sharing at all. The rejection may also stem from the violation of the assumption that the 
risk preferences are identical within the network (Schulhofer-Wohl 2011, Chiappori et al. 
                                                 
26  Previous household member refers to a person interviewed at the baseline in 1991/94. 
27 To address concerns about some of these 2010 household characteristics variables being potentially 
endogenous, we run all main regressions again, but drop each of these control variables in turn. We find 
the shock and network shock coefficients remain stable across all such re-specifications.  
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2011, Mazzocco and Saini 2012). 28 To explore the existence of reciprocal risk sharing, 
we assess whether household per capita consumption growth is responsive to shocks 
experienced by other households in the same extended family. This test builds on 
Equation (3.5). We drop the network fixed effects and replace them with baseline village 
fixed effects (𝜃𝑣) and network characteristics (𝑤𝑗) comprising the number of migrant and 
non-migrant households in the network and variables capturing characteristics of the 
initial household (such as its demographic composition, the household head's 
characteristics, including education, gender, age and the quadratic of age). We also 
include (logged) per capita consumption at the baseline (ln 𝑐𝑗,1991). The network shock 
variable, 𝑧𝑖𝑗, measures the number of households affected by an income shock. The 
household's own shocks are excluded from this variable. The partial risk-sharing 
specification is formulated as:  
(3.6) ∆ ln 𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑠𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛾 + 𝑤𝑗
′𝜗 + 𝛾 ln 𝑐𝑗,1991 + 𝜃𝑣 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 .  
A negative and statistically significant 𝛿 would imply that some risk sharing takes place 
within the extended families.  
We will assess the impact of these network shocks separately for migrant and non-migrant 
households and fully acknowledge that selection into migration is unlikely to be random. 
The differences in the observed level of risk sharing may be caused by migration or by 
some unobserved characteristics that differ between migrant and non-migrant households, 
or by some combination of both. As a result, these regressions do not allow us to say 
                                                 
28 In a context of heterogenous risk preferences, Pareto-efficient contract allocates more aggregate risk to 
less risk-averse households. As demonstrated by Schulhofer-Wohl (2011), Chiappori et al (2011) and 
Mazzocco and Saini (2012) this would lead to an upward bias in 𝛽 in Equation (3.5). The standard full risk 
sharing test is then biased against the null-hypothesis of full-risk sharing. 
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whether migration is causally responsible for the migrant taking on the role of insuring 
sedentary extended family network members, or whether the effect is driven by 
unobservables. In particular, we cannot make any statements about what would have 
happened if migrants had stayed home or the home-stayers had migrated. It is possible 
that in this parallel universe roles would have switched (migration is causally responsible) 
or not (it is driven by the unobserved differences between migrants and non-migrants). 
Our primary contribution lies in documenting the fact that migrants provide unilateral 
insurance to non-migrants, while at the same time shooting ahead of them in consumption 
terms. Nonetheless, we will dedicate Section 3.9 to shedding light on how selection fits 
into this analysis and will utilize information from additional survey rounds to exclude 
certain possible types of endogeneities.  
Finally, the baseline per capita consumption variable in Equation (3.6) raises a concern 
about endogeneity. The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗 could be correlated, for example due to 
measurement error, with the lagged consumption variable on the right hand side of 
Equation (3.6). This would then bias the estimate measuring the impact of the lagged 
consumption but it may also affect other coefficients. Fortunately, we can think of a 
credible instrument that allows us to assess this possibility. Rainfall is one of the main 
inputs in agricultural production in Kagera and poor rainfall (i.e. droughts) can have 
serious consequences for incomes. Excess rains are less of a problem due to the focus of 
the production on tree crops and also because the terrain is relatively undulating. The 
region has two rainy seasons, a long rainy season usually between March and May and a 
short rainy season usually between October and December. The agricultural production 
takes place during these seasons. Therefore, we employ average monthly z-score 
deviations of rainfall during the two rainy seasons preceding the interview and truncate 
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the positive rainfall deviations to zero. 29 Rainfall during the agricultural production is 
expected to influence consumption through income fluctuations but is unlikely to be 
correlated with the potential measurement error in the per capita consumption variable. 
The baseline village fixed effects (𝜃𝑣) in Equation (3.6) wipe out the level effects of 
rainfall in the first stage regression. Therefore, exploiting the fact that rainfall shocks will 
affect different types of households in different ways, we interact the rainfall variable 
with head's gender, age and education yielding a total of three instruments. 
3.5 Results 
We begin by testing the full risk-sharing model described above. Column 1 in Table 3.7 
provides the results for the base specification of Equation (3.5) with network fixed effects 
(NFE). The control variables capture the characteristics of the previous household 
members, including their position within the 2010 household. The signs of the control 
variables are a priori correct. For example, education has a positive impact on 
consumption growth, while households with widowed or divorced previous household 
members experience lower consumption growth than others within the same extended 
family network.  
The statistical significance of the shock coefficient, despite the inclusion of NFE, reveals 
that shocks are not insured within extended families. Households that experienced a shock 
had 14 percentage points lower consumption growth, on average and ceteris paribus, than 
households from the same extended family who did not experience a shock. The 
emergence of this wedge in the face of a shock implies a clear rejection of the full risk-
sharing model in the extended family networks in this study.  
                                                 
29 Beegle, De Weerdt and Dercon (2008) employ a similar instrumental variable approach for their lagged 
consumption variable in assessing the long-term impact of adult deaths on consumption growth in Kagera. 
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Table 3.7: The effect of shocks on consumption growth 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita 
consumption growth 
1 2 3 
 OLS, NFE OLS 2SLS 
Own shock -0.141*** -0.144*** -0.140*** 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) 
2010 household characteristics:    
Age of oldest PHHM in the household -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
A PHHM is head of the household 0.164*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 
 (0.047) (0.034) (0.034) 
A PHHM is spouse of the household head 0.110** 0.077* 0.071* 
 (0.048) (0.039) (0.042) 
A PHHM is child of the household head -0.196*** -0.184*** -0.182*** 
 (0.051) (0.037) (0.036) 
A divorced PHHM in the household -0.342*** -0.306*** -0.300*** 
 (0.068) (0.076) (0.073) 
A widowed PHHM in the household -0.333*** -0.332*** -0.328*** 
 (0.056) (0.052) (0.051) 
A married PHHM in the household -0.483*** -0.454*** -0.449*** 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) 
Max years of education of PHHM in the hh 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Number of PHHMs in the household -0.008 -0.018 -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) 
Network characteristics:    
Number of split-off households stayed  -0.056*** -0.060*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) 
Number of split-off households moved  -0.008 -0.011 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
Household characteristics at the baseline:    
Natural log value of assets in 1991  0.006 -0.009 
  (0.017) (0.027) 
Education of 1991 household head  0.003 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Head was male in 1991  -0.064* -0.082 
  (0.038) (0.053) 
Age of household head in 1991  0.010** 0.009* 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Age of head squared  -0.000** -0.000** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 3.7: The effect of shocks on consumption growth 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita 
consumption growth 
1 2 3 
 OLS, NFE OLS 2SLS 
Num of males 0-5 years in the hh  0.005 0.016 
  (0.019) (0.025) 
Num of males 6-15 years in the hh  0.049*** 0.056*** 
  (0.012) (0.016) 
Num of males 16-60 years in the hh  0.006 0.002 
  (0.016) (0.017) 
Num of males 61+ years in the hh  0.164*** 0.199*** 
  (0.049) (0.070) 
Num of females 0-5 years in the hh  0.012 0.018 
  (0.017) (0.020) 
Num of females 6-15 years in the hh  0.022* 0.027* 
  (0.012) (0.015) 
Num of females 16-60 years in the hh  0.008 0.011 
  (0.013) (0.013) 
Number of females 61+ years in the hh  0.026 0.033 
  (0.033) (0.036) 
Household had a non-earth floor in 1991  -0.008 -0.054 
  (0.047) (0.095) 
(logged) hh per capita consumption in 1991  -0.911*** -0.732** 
  (0.042) (0.290) 
Number of observations 2,349 2,349 2,349 
R2 0.202 0.421 0.412 
Adjusted R2 0.199 0.414 0.392 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Cluster-robust standard errors by baseline village 
are in parenthesis. Regressions in column 1 includes NFE, regressions in columns 2 and 3 
include baseline village fixed effects. PHHM refers to previous household member (i.e. 
person interviewed at the baseline). 
 
In column 2 we drop the NFE and replace with network characteristics, such as the 
number of migrant and non-migrant network members (which together control for 
network size and composition) and the wealth and demographics of the baseline 
household from which the network is formed. We also include baseline village fixed 
effects. The size of the shock coefficient is nearly identical to the one obtained with NFE, 
giving confidence in the network level controls we use in a later analysis of reciprocal 
risk sharing.  
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Finally, column 3 provides the Two-Stage Least Squares results that address the potential 
endogeneity problem arising from the inclusion of the initial logged per capita 
consumption variable. The first stage regression results and the standard IV-diagnostic 
tests are presented in Appendix B. The included instruments show how households 
headed by older and more educated males enjoy higher baseline consumption. The 
excluded instruments are zero-truncated negative z-score deviations of rainfall interacted 
with the household head’s age, education and gender. They show that the positive level 
effects of each of these three household head characteristics are attenuated with the 
inclusion of negative rainfall shocks. The Cragg and Donald (1993) test yields 19.1 
indicating that our instruments are relevant. Comparison with the critical values provided 
in Stock and Yogo (2005) suggests that the bias of our IV-estimate is less than five per 
cent of the OLS estimate. The Hansen (1982) J-test provides a p-value of 0.570. Thus, 
the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the instrument and the error term is upheld 
at conventional levels. The shock coefficient and the standard error from the 2SLS 
estimates are almost identical to those from OLS, indicating that the potential endogeneity 
of the logged per capita baseline consumption has a negligible influence on the shock 
variable. 30 In the light of this, we use the more efficient OLS method to make inferences 
in the remainder of the text.  
Next we test whether any risk sharing takes place in these networks. As discussed earlier, 
we replace the NFE with network characteristics and baseline village fixed effects and 
augment the specification with the network shock variable. The first column in Table 3.8 
reports the results for the migrant households and the second column for the non-migrant 
households. For migrants, the network shock coefficient is negative and highly 
                                                 
30 A C-test (see e.g., Hayashi 2000p. 220-221) with one degree of freedom yields χ2-test statistic of 0.104 
(p=0.748). Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the lagged consumption variable is exogenous. 
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significant. These network shocks have a sizeable impact on migrant household 
consumption: on average, a shock in one household in the network resulted in a drop of 
five percentage points in consumption growth. As shocks are not correlated within the 
extended family networks (the intra-class correlation coefficient equals 0.017 with a 
standard error of 0.016), this finding reveals that migrants insure other households in their 
extended families. Non-migrant households, on the other hand, do not appear to be 
affected by the network shocks. The point estimate is nearly zero and insignificant. These 
results suggest that the risk-sharing arrangement is not reciprocal. 
In order to investigate this further, we decompose the network shock variable into shocks 
in non-migrant and migrant households. The first variable measures the number of non-
migrant households that experienced a shock in the extended family. The second network 
shock variable measures the number of migrant households affected by shocks. As before, 
the household's own shocks have been excluded from these variables.  
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Table 3.9 presents the regression results. Migrants are susceptible to shocks affecting 
other migrant and non-migrant households within their extended family network, while 
non-migrants are sensitive to neither. On average, a shock in one non-migrant household 
in the network leads to a drop of 5.5 percentage points in migrant household's 
consumption growth. Shocks in other migrant households have a negative effect of 
similar magnitude on a migrant's consumption than shocks experienced in stayer 
households but this coefficient is not statistically significant at a conventional level 
(p=0.127).  
Given the patrilocal migration patterns where women migrate largely because of marriage 
(see Table 3.3), it is reasonable to ask to what extent they remain linked to their original 
family. In Tables A.1 and A.2 of Appendix A we explore the gender dimension in risk 
sharing by interacting the shock variables with the male dummy. The results show that 
the findings in Table 3.8 and 3.9 are not driven by male migrants suggesting that also 
female migrants engage in insuring their family members back home. 
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Table 3.8: The effect of network shocks on consumption growth 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita consumption growth 
Migrant 
households 
Non-migrant 
households 
 1 2 
 OLS OLS 
Number of households that experienced a shock in the 
network 
-0.050*** 0.008 
(0.018) (0.015) 
Own shock -0.094** -0.060* 
 (0.043) (0.032) 
Number of split-off hhs stayed -0.031* -0.032** 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
Number of split-off hhs moved -0.008 -0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Age of oldest PHHM in the 2010 hh 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
A PHHM is head of this 2010 hh 0.160*** 0.220*** 
 (0.056) (0.054) 
A PHHM is spouse of this 2010 hh's head -0.042 0.185*** 
 (0.059) (0.057) 
A PHHM is child of this 2010 hh's head -0.356*** -0.008 
 (0.099) (0.044) 
A Divorced PHHM in 2010 hh -0.363*** -0.165* 
 (0.111) (0.088) 
A widowed PHHM in 2010 hh -0.412*** -0.124** 
 (0.125) (0.052) 
A married PHHM in 2010 hh -0.431*** -0.246*** 
 (0.052) (0.051) 
Max years of education of PHHM in this 2010 hh 0.072*** 0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Number of PHHMs in this 2010 hh 0.050 -0.063*** 
 (0.047) (0.023) 
(logged) hh per capita consumption in 1991 -0.978*** -0.848*** 
 (0.049) (0.053) 
Number of observations 1,270 1,079 
R2 0.462 0.390 
Adjusted R2 0.450 0.374 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by baseline village are 
in parenthesis. Regressions include baseline village fixed effects and variables controlling 
for household characteristics at the baseline. PHHM refers to previous household member 
(i.e. person interviewed at the baseline). 
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Table 3.9: Network shocks in migrant and non-migrant households 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita consumption growth 
Migrant 
households 
Non-migrant 
households 
 1 2 
 OLS OLS 
Number of non-migrant hhs that experienced a shock in the 
network 
-0.055** 0.013 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
Number of migrant hhs that experienced a shock in the 
network 
-0.043 0.002 
 (0.028) (0.023) 
Own shock -0.093** -0.059* 
 (0.043) (0.032) 
Number of split-off hhs stayed -0.030* -0.034** 
 (0.018) (0.015) 
Number of split-off hhs moved -0.009 -0.024* 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Number of observations 1,270 1,079 
R2 0.463 0.390 
Adjusted R2 0.450 0.374 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by baseline village are in 
parenthesis. Regressions include baseline village fixed effects, 2010 household level variables 
capturing characteristics of the previous household members and variables controlling for 
household characteristics at the baseline. 
 
We conclude that migrant households are partially and unilaterally insuring households 
that stay behind. This lack of reciprocity violates the predictions of the reciprocity-based 
models (without a social norms term). Because, on average, migrants are nearly twice as 
rich as those who remained at home, these findings are consistent with reciprocity-based 
models augmented with a social norms term, which attenuates the participation, truth-
telling or incentive compatibility constraints.  
3.6 Other transactional insurance motives 
An alternative explanation to the observed lack of reciprocity could be that migrants 
insure non-migrants in exchange for other benefits. By concentrating on consumption 
differences we have considered only current pay-offs from any risk-sharing arrangement. 
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It is quite possible that the benefits are still to accrue to the migrant in the more distant 
future. Lucas and Stark (1985) mention that there could be exchange motives for 
insurance provision relating to the desire for non-migrants to look after local assets, the 
intention to return home and the aspiration to inherit. In a context that lacks technology 
to allow future income to be consumed now, we could confuse unilateral insurance with 
postponed reciprocity. Fortunately, the KHDS questionnaire is particularly rich and we 
are thus able to explore some of these issues.  
The questionnaire asks each migrant about asset holdings in the baseline village. As our 
outcome variable is consumption growth we cannot use these asset holdings as 
explanatory variables: current wealth is surely endogenous to growth in wealth. We 
attempt to circumvent this problem by looking at the share of assets in the current 
portfolio that are located in the village. While it remains possible that portfolio 
composition is endogenous to consumption growth, we believe the results are informative 
enough to report.  
About 28 per cent of migrants have assets in the baseline village and 25 per cent of 
migrants own land in the baseline village. For land we have exact area measurements, but 
not monetary values. If migrants engage in risk sharing with those who remain at home 
for the purpose of maintaining land and ensuring their continued entitlement to the land 
(which is important in a country with few formal land deeds), then we would expect more 
responsiveness to network shocks from people with a larger share of their land holdings 
in the baseline village. The first column of Table 3.9 explores this. As before, the 
dependent variable is logged per capita consumption growth. We interact the non-migrant 
network shocks with a variable measuring the share of the land in the baseline village. 
The coefficient on this interacted variable turns out insignificant implying that the share 
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of land in the baseline village neither increases nor decreases the insurance provision. 
Land ownership and the eagerness to hold onto it may differ across the gender lines. To 
test whether the lack of statistically significant interaction effect is due to pooling male 
and female migrants together, we disaggregated the sample by gender and re-ran the first 
column of Table 3.9. The results in Table A.3 of Appendix A show that the finding holds 
for both sub-samples: the insurance arrangement is not driven by land ownership in the 
baseline village.  
In the second column in Table 3.10 we interact the non-migrant network shock variable 
with the length of the migration spell. Following Dustmann and Mestres (2010), we argue 
this to be a measure of the permanence and success of the move and an inverse measure 
of the return likelihood. We find that the duration of the migration spell does not have 
any impact on migrant's insurance provision. This also holds when we use non-linear 
versions of the migration duration in the form of a piecewise linear spline. Due to the 
patrilocal migration patterns, it is plausible that the return likelihood of women is lower 
and in turn might correlate differently with the extent of their insurance provision. As 
before, we explored this by re-running the test with gender disaggregated samples but the 
original outcome holds for both sub-samples (see Table A.3 of Appendix A). 
The third column in Table 3.10 investigates whether the expectation to inherit is a 
plausible motive for unilateral insurance. Since traditional law excludes women from 
inheriting land, a household can only inherit land if it has male members whose parents 
own clan land in the baseline village. 31 We construct a variable that captures these 
households and also control for cases where the parents no longer live in the baseline 
village in order to isolate the inheritance story from the effect of having parents in the 
                                                 
31 Land in this context normally belongs to the clan and the purpose of the traditional law is to keep in the 
clan (see De Weerdt 2010). 
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baseline village. Nearly 42 percent of the migrant households have parental clan land 
holdings waiting for them in the baseline village. By interacting the non-migrant network 
shocks with a parental clan land holdings dummy, we find that that these households are 
no more (or less) engaged in insurance provision than households that do not expect to 
inherit land.32 
A final transactional motive that could be consistent with the regression results is that 
non-migrants pay insurance premiums to migrants in return for their continued insurance 
provision. This does not seem consistent with the findings of Table 3.2, where we noted 
that migrants are net senders of transfers.  
  
                                                 
32
 Since this test already exploits the gender dimension in the inheritance law we are not able, nor feel 
necessary, to conduct this test for the two gender groups. 
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Table 3.10: Other transactional insurance motives 
 Migrant households 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita consumption growth 1 2 3 
Number of non-migrant hhs that experienced a shock in the 
network 
-0.042 -0.050 -0.048 
(0.028) (0.063) (0.045) 
--- Interacted with:    
 * Share of land in BLV in total land portfolio -0.055   
 (0.054)   
 * Number of years since the last PHHM migrated into this hh  -0.001  
  (0.005)  
 * Hh has inheritable land in the baseline village   0.019 
   (0.055) 
 * Hh member's parent lives in BLV   -0.032 
   (0.063) 
Own shock -0.085** -0.097** -0.090** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) 
Share of land in BLV in total land portfolio 0.300***   
 (0.064)   
Household does not own land 0.262***  0.171*** 
 (0.047)  (0.043) 
Number of years since the last PHHM migrated into this hh  -0.001  
  (0.004)  
Hh has inheritable land in the baseline village   -0.016 
   (0.066) 
Hh member's parent lives in BLV   0.054 
   (0.063) 
Number of split-off hhs stayed -0.021 -0.028 -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Number of split-off hhs moved -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Number of observations 1,270 1,270 1,270 
R2 0.487 0.462 0.470 
Adjusted R2 0.474 0.449 0.456 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by baseline village are in 
parenthesis. Regressions include baseline village fixed effects, 2010 household level variables 
capturing characteristics of the previous household members and variables controlling for 
household characteristics at the baseline. 
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3.7 Is there a kin tax? 
Does the migrant incur a significant cost for providing this unilateral insurance? From 
Table 3.9 we observe that for each shock to the extended family network at home there is 
a drop of 5.5 percentage points in the migrant’s consumption, which appears to be a 
permanent deviation from the growth curve. The average migrant has 0.53 network 
shocks of non-migrants, resulting in an implied overall consumption growth penalty of 
2.9 percentage points, on average, over the 19-year period. Over this same period, the 
average consumption growth among migrants was 108 per cent, implying that insurance 
constituted an average annual growth penalty of around 0.077 of one percentage point 
(reducing average annual growth roughly from 3.93 per cent to 3.86 per cent). 33 Put 
another way, migrants share about 2.7 per cent of their very substantial growth by insuring 
family members at their original location. 34   
This is a lower-bound estimate because we cannot exclude the possibility that we are only 
measuring a subset of relevant shocks: if shocks are self-reported then respondents may 
fail to mention those that were effectively insured. Fortunately, the survey provides an 
alternative shock measure, which is not self-reported. We have historical rainfall data 
from the Tanzanian Meteorological Agency for gauges in 212 weather stations in Kagera 
and the migration destinations in our sample. In a first step, each household is linked to 
all rainfall stations within a 100 km radius. Next, a monthly rainfall figure is calculated 
for each household by weighing each monthly rainfall reading with the inverse of the 
distance of the rainfall station where it was recorded to the household in question.  
                                                 
33 We use geometric (rather than arithmetic) means to calculate the average annual growth rates.  
34 The 95%-confidence interval for the annual growth penalty is [0.0002, 0.1515] and for the 'kin-tax' [0.01, 
5.40]. 
57 
 
 
 
The mean distance to the nearest rainfall station is 10 km and the median is 23 km. For 
each household we can calculate average monthly z-score deviations of rainfall during 
the two rainy seasons, in relation to the 30 year average (1980-2010) for that village. 
Rainfall shocks are then constructed by truncating the positive yearly average rainfall 
deviations to zero. We calculate a non-migrant household’s own shock as the most 
negative shock in the 1994-2009 period. The first row in Table 3.11 shows that rainfall 
shocks are important in determining consumption growth, with every standard deviation 
decrease in (negative) rainfall deviation causing consumption growth to decline by 12 
percentage points for migrants and 18 percentage points for non-migrants.35  
Table 3.11: Re-calculating the kin-tax through rainfall data 
 Migrant households Non-migrant households 
 mean 1 mean 2 
max rain shock in own 
location a) 
-0.70 0.115** -1.17 0.179** 
[0.52] (0.045) [0.30] (0.076) 
max rain shock in deviation 
in baseline village b) 
-0.63 0.079*   
[0.56] (0.046)   
max rain shock in deviation 
in migrant locations b) 
  -1.21 -0.014 
  [0.29] (0.086) 
Number of observations 1,270 1,079 
R2 n/a 0.471 n/a 0.400 
Adjusted R2 n/a 0.458 n/a 0.382 
baseline district FE?  n/a yes n/a yes 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a) For migrants this is after they moved to their 2010 location, for non-migrants this refers 
to 1994-2009. 
b) After the migrant moved to their 2010 location. 
Standard deviations in brackets. Cluster-robust standard errors by baseline village are in 
parenthesis. Regressions include 2010 household level variables capturing characteristics 
of the previous household members and variables controlling for household characteristics 
at the baseline. 
 
                                                 
35 Out of the 1,270 migrant households 77 per cent report to derive (at least some) income from agricultural 
production and 73 per cent own land. The results reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.11 are robust to 
restricting the migrant sample to these households. 
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Knowing that rainfall shocks drive the incomes of both stayer and migrant households, 
we can use them as an alternative network shock indicator. We replace the network shock 
variable with the baseline village rainfall shock variable in Equation (3.6). For migrant 
households, this rainfall shock is constructed as the most negative rainfall deviation in the 
baseline village after the migrant left. For stayer households, we take the most negative 
rainfall deviation among the migrant household locations, after the migrant arrived to the 
current location. Due to the covariate nature of the rainfall shocks we cannot use the 
baseline village fixed effects in the stayer household specification. Similarly, there is little 
variation in the baseline village rainfall shock variable among migrants that originate 
from the same village. We therefore replace the baseline village fixed effects with 
baseline district fixed effects. 36 Column 1 reports the results for the migrant households. 
We see that after the migrants leave their consumption remains responsive to rainfall 
shocks at the baseline village. Once we use rainfall shocks the kin tax goes up to 5.0 
percentage points. 37 We consider the parsimonious rainfall shock specification from 
Table 3.11 as the upper bound effect, binding the estimate between 2.7 and 4.6 per cent.  
Column 2 reports the corresponding results for the non-migrant households. Consistent 
with the results presented in Section 3.5, we see that non-migrants are not affected by 
rainfall shocks that take place in migrant households.  
It is interesting, if slightly misleading (see below), to point out that our implicit tax rate 
of three to five per cent is of the same order of magnitude as that found in two other 
studies. Jakiela and Ozier (2012) estimate that women in a laboratory setting in Kenya 
                                                 
36 Households group into 51 baseline village and 6 baseline districts. For migrants, the baseline village fixed 
effects exploit the variation arising from the fact that migrants leave at different times. This yields almost 
an identical coefficient but due to the limited variation remaining in the data, the coefficient is not 
significant at a conventional level (p=0.155). 
37 The 95 per cent confidence interval for the kin tax ranges between 0.7 and 10.7 percentage points. 
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acted as if they were expecting to be pressured to share four per cent of their experiment 
winnings with relatives that were not present at the experiment. Ambler (2012) reports 
that El Salvadorian migrants living around Washington DC remit five per cent more of a 
windfall income if they know the potential recipients at home will be informed about it. 
However, we consider these striking similarities in magnitude to be slightly misleading. 
First, the above studies focus on the effect, on sharing, of providing full information on a 
windfall income, while our figures reflect the effect of shocks on sharing within real-
world belief sets. Second, these experimental studies capture short-run dynamics while 
our study focuses on consumption growth over a more protracted 19-year period.  
3.8 Endogeneity of migration 
Much of the research on migration is concerned with establishing its causal effects. The 
primary goal of this essay, however, is quite different. Here, we aim to document what 
happens to a traditional institution, like informal insurance, in a society that modernizes 
and is characterized by massive internal migration. The strength of the essay lies in its 
ability to describe this process within linked extended family networks, over a protracted 
two decade time period and exploiting all the richness of the real world. Even then, 
causality remains important in that it relates to the external validity of our results. If 
migration is not causally responsible for the empirical patterns described in the previous 
sections then that should increase one’s degree of skepticism about these same patterns 
applying in other settings where the selection process into migration is different.  
Our data are not experimental and their real-world richness comes at the cost of not being 
able to provide iron clad proof of causality. Fortunately, we are able to exploit more 
survey rounds in order to speak to the causality issue and exclude certain forms of 
unobserved heterogeneity as explanations for the results. The purpose of this section is to 
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be very specific about which remaining types of endogeneity could compete with 
causality to explain the results.  
Thus far the essay has used waves one and six of the survey. This section will exploit the 
four waves that lie between. In what follows it is useful to bear in mind that consumption 
was measured comparably within waves 1, 5 and 6 and within waves 2, 3 and 4 – but not 
between these two groups of waves.38 
As our left hand side variable is consumption growth, a first set of concerns relates to 
whether migrants start out from similar consumption positions at baseline (compared to 
non-migrants) and whether, prior to migration, they are following a similar growth path. 
We can test this by regressing baseline consumption on future migration status (𝑀𝑖,2010) 
and use baseline village fixed effects (𝜃𝑣) and control for the initial household 
characteristics (𝑤𝑗) used in Equation (3.6) (and listed in Table 3.6): 
(3.7) 𝑌𝑖 =∝ 𝑀𝑖,2010 + 𝑤𝑗
′𝜗 + 𝜃𝑣 + 𝜀𝑖.  
In the first column ofTable 3.12,  𝑌𝑖 is the natural logarithm of the consumption level at 
baseline. The insignificance of the future migration coefficient shows that our extensive 
controls manage to capture the heterogeneity with respect to baseline start-off levels: 
migrants started off at the same position as non-migrants, ceteris paribus.  
We then replace the right-hand side of Equation (3.7) with (logged) consumption at the 
baseline. The second column of Table 3.12 exploits information on consumption growth 
between rounds 2, 3 and 4 (1992-1994) to ask whether growth across those three rounds 
                                                 
38 The primary concern is the difference in recall period. Beegle et al. (2012) look at how differential recall 
periods affect consumption aggregates, using data from a survey experiment conducted in Tanzania. 
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can be explained by future migration status. We find that it cannot: migrants and non-
migrants were on the same growth curve prior to migration, given the controls we use.  
Table 3.12: The effect of future migration on baseline consumption levels and 
short-run growth (1992-94) 
Dependent variable: 
logged per 
capita 
consumption 
per capita in 
wave 1 
consumption 
growth 1991-4 
(waves 2-4):  
Δ ln(conspc) 
 1 2 
migrant in 2010 -0.017 0.017 
 (0.038) (0.045) 
(logged) household per capita 
consumption in 1991 
 -0.064 
 (0.041) 
Number of observations 803 782 
R2 0.198 0.032 
Adjusted R2 0.183 0.012 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Cluster-robust standard errors 
by baseline village are in parenthesis. Regressions include baseline 
village fixed effects (θv) and control for the initial household 
characteristics (wj) used in Equation (3.6) (and listed in Table 3.6)  
 
Finally, we preclude the possibility that there are any time invariant traits of migrants and 
non-migrants, such as risk preferences, that are jointly determining their migration 
decision and the respective roles they take on in the insurance arrangement. This test 
exploits the fact that some migrants migrated after we observe them in 2004. We restrict 
the sample to 1,146 households that had not migrated by 2004 and re-estimate Equation 
(3.6) using growth in (logged) consumption from 1991 to 2004 as the dependent variable. 
39 We also include a dummy that captures those 151 households that will migrate between 
2004 and 2010.  
                                                 
39 The term 𝑥𝑖𝑗  now refers to household characteristics in 2004 with respect to its previous household 
members. 
62 
 
 
 
In column 1 of Table 3.13, we see that the future migration status is not significant 
indicating that, ceteris paribus, migrants and non-migrants were on the same long-run 
growth path. Households are negatively affected by own shocks and network shocks, 
although the latter is marginally insignificant at p=0.112. In the reduced sample baseline 
village fixed effects take a high toll on the degrees of freedom, with only an average of 
three migrant households per village, compared to 25 migrant households per village in 
the main regressions. In column 3, we replace the baseline village fixed effects with 
baseline district fixed effects. The coefficient on the migration dummy remains 
insignificant and both own and network shocks yield a significant and negative effect on 
consumption growth. Taken together this reveals that the sample of 1,146 non-migrant 
households was sharing risk in the period prior to their migration.  
In columns 2 and 4 we interact the network shock variable with 2010 migration status. 
This interaction is not significant, irrespective of using baseline village or district fixed 
effects. This shows that migrant and non-migrant households are both responsive to each 
other’s shocks prior to the move and the insurance relationship becomes unilateral only 
after the move. Similar to a difference-in-difference estimator, this excludes the 
possibility that time invariant characteristics of either party are driving the results.  
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Table 3.13: The effect of future migration on long-run growth and pre-
migration insurance contract type 
Dependent variable: (logged) per 
capita consumption growth 1991-2004 
1 2 3 4 
migrant in 2010  0.058 0.065 0.047 0.059 
 (0.051) (0.066) (0.053) (0.066) 
own shock -0.064* -0.064* -0.069** -0.069** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) 
number of (other) stayer households 
affected by shock 
-0.047 -0.046 -0.047* -0.045* 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
--- Interacted with:     
* (migrant in 2010)  -0.009  -0.017 
  (0.049)  (0.048) 
Number of observations 1,146 1,146 1,146 1,146 
R2 0.405 0.405 0.412 0.424 
Adjusted R2 0.390 0.389 0.397 0.405 
baseline village FE? yes yes no no 
baseline district FE? no no yes yes 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by baseline 
village are in parenthesis. Regressions include 2004 household level variables 
capturing characteristics of the previous household members and variables controlling 
for household characteristics at the baseline. 
 
Taken together, the results in Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 tell us that there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants with respect to the starting position 
and slopes of their short-run (1992-1994) and long-run (1991-2004) growth paths prior 
to migration. Results from Table 3.13 further suggest that the insurance contract was 
characterized by reciprocity before the move and only became unilateral after the move. 
We can therefore be confident that the effect of migration on informal insurance is either 
causal, or it is driven by the occurrence of a time variant event (like a shock pulling or 
pushing someone into migration), or change in individual characteristic (like coming of 
age, achieving higher levels of education or winning a lottery), which causes one to both 
migrate and assume the special role in the insurance network.  
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3.9 Robustness 
We conducted an array of robustness checks to validate our findings. 40  First, we find that 
the results are robust to an alternative migrant definition where also households that 
moved to a nearby village are defined as non-migrants (see footnote 18).  
Second, the results are not driven by the configuration of the data. The shock data were 
initially defined at individual level while our outcome variable is measured at household 
level. Conducting the empirical analysis at individual level does not affect our main 
findings (see footnote 24). 
Third, defining household consumption per adult equivalent instead of per household 
member yields close to identical results in all specifications (see footnote 22).  
Fourth, changing the way we isolate the shocks that occurred before the households split 
does not change our results either (see footnote 25). 
Fifth, we also checked whether the potential endogeneity of some of our control variables 
is driving our results. As discussed in Section 3.5, instrumenting the lagged consumption 
variable does not affect the shock coefficient. In addition, when the 2010 household level 
control variables are omitted one-by-one, the estimated shock coefficients remain stable 
across all specifications (see footnote 27).  
3.10  Conclusions 
In the next few decades internal migration is likely to drive the development process in 
Africa. This demographic process is evident in the data used in this essay. Starting from 
the household rosters of a representative household survey conducted nearly two decades 
ago in Kagera, we find that over half of the original household members had moved 
                                                 
40 The results of these robustness checks are available upon request. 
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internally, while very few moved internationally. We document how this powerful current 
of migration, an integral part of development, interacts with a traditional institution like 
informal risk sharing to shape economic mobility and vulnerability. 
We find that internal migrants provide unilateral insurance to those who remain at home, 
which seems to be driven by social norms rather than exchange motives. The total, final, 
long-run effect of this insurance provision on the migrant’s growth amounts to a 2.7 to 
4.6 per cent sacrifice in consumption (2.9 to 5.0 percentage points off the 108 % total 
growth realized by the migrant).  
While our study cannot conclusively say where migrants would be without their extended 
family networks back home, a 'tax rate' of 2.7 to 4.6 per cent seems too low to be an 
important brake on a migrant’s growth. We do know that migrants who have severed links 
with home perform worse than other migrants and one should not overlook the fact that, 
while starting out from similar baseline welfare levels, migrants realize a total 
consumption growth which is three times higher than that of non-migrants. 
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4 Essay 2: Temperature Shocks, Household 
Consumption and Internal Migration 
4.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 3, internal migration typically takes a central stage when 
underdeveloped countries modernize and move away from subsistence agriculture (Lewis 
1954, Ranis and Fei 1961, Chenery and Syrquin 1975, Collier and Dercon 2009). At the 
micro-level, an emerging empirical literature documents how internal migration is 
associated with large income gains and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (Beegle, 
De Weerdt, and Dercon 2011, Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Todo 2013, Young 2013).  
In this essay, I investigate whether financial constraints in the rural areas inhibit 
migration. The essay views long-term migration as an investment. 41 Migration is 
associated with various costs (e.g., travel expenses, search costs in the destination area) 
that are borne up front. In the presence of liquidity and credit constraints, potential 
migrants can only finance migration by accumulating enough savings in the previous 
period. Approximately 97 per cent of African crop land is rainfed (Faurès and Santini 
2008) rendering the livelihoods of rural households extremely vulnerable to weather 
variation. This strong correlation between weather outcomes and rural incomes imply that 
constrained households may not be able to finance migration costs in bad weather years. 
In other words, if liquidity constraints bind, migration rates decrease with negative 
weather shocks and increase with positive ones. Such correlation between weather and 
migration should not exist in the absence of binding liquidity constraints. 
                                                 
41 This essay only considers long-term internal migration spells. For studies that analyse the impact of 
exogenous income shocks on temporary or seasonal internal migration, see (Jayachandran (2006), Bryan, 
Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2013)). For research focusing on international migration, see (Halliday (2006), 
Feng, Krueger, and Oppenheimer (2010), Angelucci (2013), Bazzi (2013)). 
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I again use the KHDS data to test this hypothesis. As noted in Chapter 2, the survey 
provides baseline data based on a comprehensive household questionnaire administered 
in 1991-1994. The latest round of the survey conducted in 2010 attempted to track all 
individuals, irrespective of whether they still resided in the same village or not. This 
follow-up round also collected detailed information on migration histories since 1994. 
These data are then linked to historical temperature and rainfall data in an attempt to shed 
light on how local weather shocks shape long-term migration decisions in a context of 
mass migration (see section 3.1). In Chapter 3, we found that migrants maintain insurance 
links to those who remain (for other studies documenting similar evidence, see 
Rosenzweig and Stark 1989, Yang and Choi 2007). However, the results reject reciprocal 
risk sharing between migrants and their non-migrant family members implying that, in 
this context, migration is not the result of a household level maximization strategy. 
Section 4.6 of this essay returns to this issue providing evidence that supports this finding. 
In section 4.3, I show how household welfare co-moves with local weather events. Using 
consumption as the welfare metric, the results show that households are highly vulnerable 
to temperature changes during the growing season. Controlling for rainfall, household 
fixed effects and various time-varying factors, I find that a one standard deviation increase 
in the mean monthly growing season temperature decreases household per capita 
consumption by 4.9 per cent, on average and ceteris paribus. This part of the analysis 
speaks to the emerging literature that documents how temperature shocks cause large 
fluctuations in economic outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012, 
Schlenker and Lobell 2010a, Burke et al. 2011). The use of national level output data, 
GDP (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012) or country-level yields (Burke et al. 2011, Schlenker 
and Lobell 2010a), raises the question of whether these estimated impacts hold at the 
68 
 
 
 
micro level.42 This essay presents, to my knowledge, the first attempt to quantify the 
impact of temperature changes exploiting household level data from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
43 The results presented here broadly agree with this macro literature. 
Having established that household incomes co-move with weather outcomes, I then run 
reduced form regressions to model migration decisions. More specifically, I use discrete 
time event history models (Allison 1982, Jenkins 1995) to test whether these local 
weather shocks affect long-term migration decisions in Tanzania. Consistent with the 
hypothesis above, positive temperature deviations reduce long-term migration among 
men. A one standard deviation increase in the previous year’s average monthly growing 
season temperature reduces the overall male migration rate by about 13 per cent. This 
finding provides evidence of binding liquidity constraints. Female migration is not 
affected by these shocks possibly due the fact that it is largely motivated by marriage and 
family in this context as already noted in the previous chapter.  
A small but emerging body of literature provides mixed evidence on the impact of 
weather variation on internal migration.44 Gray and Mueller (2012b) find that flooding 
had little effect on migration patterns in Bangladesh while crop shocks (mainly due to the 
lack of rainfall) tended to increase migration. In Ethiopia, droughts were found to increase 
men’s labour related migration but decrease female marriage related migration (Gray and 
Mueller 2012a). There are two recent studies that examine the link between temperature 
and internal migration. Dillon, Mueller, and Salau (2011) find that men are more likely 
to migrate in Northern Nigeria if the temperatures were below or above the long-term 
                                                 
42 Such aggregation problems are typical in Economics (see Blundell and Stoker 2005). 
43 Skoufias and Vinha (2013) study the impact of temperature and rainfall shocks on household 
consumption in rural Mexico. Mueller, Gray, and Kosec (2014) measure the impact of temperature and 
rainfall changes on household income in Pakistan. 
44 For recent literature reviews, see Lilleør and Van den Broeck (2011) and Marchiori, Maystadt, and 
Schumacher (2013). 
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mean. Mueller, Gray, and Kosec (2014) study the impact of temperature and rainfall using 
data from Pakistan. The authors find that positive temperature deviations increase 
migration rates both among men and women. Furthermore, recent evidence from cross-
country studies suggests that weather anomalies have increased urbanization in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher 2012, Barrios, Bertinelli, and 
Strobl 2006). I contribute to this literature by providing a theoretical framework in which 
to rationalise the results that depart from the predictions of the conventional models of 
migration (namely, Harris and Todaro 1970). Finally, I explicitly show how weather 
shocks cause large fluctuations in household welfare. Surprisingly, this step of 
establishing a channel through which weather variation affects migration decisions is 
largely absent in the existing literature on this topic (see, Lilleør and Van den Broeck 
2011). 45 
The structure of this essay can now be outlined. The next section provides a theoretical 
framework that links migration decisions to temporary income shocks. Section 4.2 
describes the context and the data used in the analysis. Section 4.3 shows how household 
consumption co-moves with temperature in Kagera. Section 4.4 first describes the 
econometric model used to analyse migration patterns in Kagera and then presents the 
results. Section 4.5 discusses the robustness of the empirical results. Section 4.6 looks 
into the link between long-term weather variability and migration. Section 4.7 concludes. 
                                                 
45 Recent study by Mueller, Gray, and Kosec (2014) is an exception. Similar to this essay, the authors study 
the impact of weather variation on household welfare and migration rates using long panel data from 
Pakistan.  
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4.2 Data 
4.2.1 Context 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the region has two rainy seasons in which agricultural 
production takes place. The long rainy season (Masika) occurs usually between March 
and May and the short rainy season (Vuli) between October and December. Figure 4.1 
shows the average monthly rainfall patterns over a 30-year period. Figure 4.2 reveals that 
the average monthly temperatures in the region range between 21 and 23.5 °C. 
Figure 4.1: Average monthly rainfall patterns in 1980-2009 in Kagera 
 
Source: own calculations from rainfall data from the Tanzanian Meteorological 
agency. 
Note: The long rainy season months are March, April and May and the short 
rainy season October, November and December. 
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Figure 4.2: Average monthly temperatures in 1981-2009 in Kagera 
 
Source: own calculations from NASA’s Modern-Era Retrospective analysis for 
Research and Applications (MERRA) data. 
Note: The long rainy season months are March, April and May and the short 
rainy season months are October, November and December. 
 
4.2.2 Migration 
Earlier work using these data report large income gains from internal migration. Using 
the 1991-2004 panel of the survey, Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon (2011) find that 
migrants enjoy a 36 percentage point growth premium over non-migrants – even after 
controlling for selection. As documented in Table 3.4 of Chapter 3, the 2010 data show 
that despite only minor differences in welfare in early 1990s, those who migrated out of 
the region became twice as rich as those who decided to stay.  
The 2010 questionnaire collected detailed information about migration histories. The 
migration module focused on long-term migration spells of at least six months. Each 
panel respondent was asked how many times they had migrated and the year they first 
left the baseline village. For return migrants, the year of return to the baseline village is 
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also known. The essay focuses on long-term migration decisions. This focus is motivated 
by the data: the mean – right censored – migration spell is 8.4 years (median: 8).  
The recall nature of the questionnaire is less of a concern here. First, as we tracked 
individuals who migrated, these questions were asked directly from the migrants and not, 
as often is the case, from those who stayed behind. Second, the questionnaire focused on 
long-term migration spells. Psychological and survey methodological literature suggests 
that individuals are (more) likely to remember salient events (Dex 1995), such as 
weddings or long-term migration spells. This is further confirmed by Smith and Thomas 
(2003) who employ matched migration history data from Malaysia to model recall bias 
associated with migration. They find that the length of the migration spell was positively 
associated with the likelihood that the respondent reported to have migrated and 
recommend that migration history modules should focus on moves that lasted at least six 
months.  
As described in Table 3.3 of Chapter 3, more than one-third of the female respondents 
but none of the male respondents cited marriage as the reason for migrating. Typically, 
the future husband and his household are responsible for the bride price. This eases the 
financial burden associated with migration at the origin household. Therefore, it is 
anticipated that female migration patterns are less affected by temperature shocks. Less 
than 15 per cent of the female respondents reported that they left because of work. In 
contrast, almost 45 per cent of the male migrants reported to have moved because they 
had found work or went looking for work. Given these differences in out-migration 
motives, in Section 4.4, I analyse the impact of weather shocks on migration patterns 
separately for men and women.  
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Age is one of the main determinants of migration decisions. This can be seen in Figure 
4.3 and Figure 4.4 that depict the annual migration rates for each age group by gender. 
We see that the fraction of individuals leaving is low at about two per cent before the age 
of 15. After this age, many children finish schooling and leave because of work or 
marriage. The hazard rate peaks around the age of 20 and declines thereafter. The mobility 
after the age of 39 is low. This motivates restricting the migration analysis to 15 to 39 
year individuals.46 
Figure 4.3: Fraction of males migrating by age 
 
  
                                                 
46 Also previous studies have focused on this age group (e.g., Gray and Mueller 2012a, 2012b). 
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Figure 4.4: Fraction of females migrating by age 
 
Education is another important determinant of out-migration. Figure 4.5 provides the 
annual migration rates by educational status for men and Figure 4.6 for women. The rates 
vary across educational categories with individuals with secondary degrees more likely 
to leave.  
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Figure 4.5: Annual hazard rates among men by level of education 
 
 
Note the changes in scale in the vertical axis 
 
Mean annual hazard rates: 
 
 mean std. dev. 
less than primary 0.014 0.004 
primary 0.054 0.015 
secondary 0.183 0.102 
overall 0.058 0.014 
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Figure 4.6: Annual hazard rates among women by level of education 
 
Note the changes in scale in the vertical axis 
 
Mean annual hazard rates: 
   
 mean std. dev. 
less than primary 0.023 0.006 
primary 0.088 0.019 
secondary 0.157 0.078 
overall 0.086 0.017 
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4.2.3 Temperature and rainfall data 
For a given geographical area, the quality of the weather data typically depends on the 
number of active weather stations. In poor countries, the collection of accurate weather 
data may not always be a priority. In Africa, like in many other continents, the number of 
active weather stations has been in steady decline over the past decades (Lorenz and 
Kunstmann 2012). Thus, the so called re-analysis data based on combining satellite and 
in situ observations provide a valuable resource for regions with a sparse station network.  
The temperature data come from NASA’s Modern-Era Retrospective analysis for 
Research and Applications (MERRA). MERRA is a global gridded data set based on 
retrospective analysis of historical weather data obtained from satellite images and 
weather stations (Rienecker et al. 2011). I use GPS coordinates to link the gridded 
temperature data to the baseline villages. The data set provides daily temperature 
measures aggregated into grids that are 1/2° in latitude × 2/3° in longitude (roughly 55 
km × 75 km at the equator).  
I also need data on rainfall. Temperature and rainfall are likely to be correlated and 
without the inclusion of rainfall the identification may suffer from the classic omitted 
variable bias (Auffhammer et al. 2013).47 For rainfall I can exploit data based on a dense 
station network.48 I have historical rainfall data from the Tanzanian Meteorological 
Agency for gauges in more than 200 weather stations in Tanzania. For Kagera, I take all 
weather stations within the 100 km radius from each village (17 stations in total) and link 
                                                 
47 The mean within-village correlation coefficient between the growing season temperature and rainfall 
over 1994-2009 is -0.347 with a standard deviation of 0.189. 
48 The network of stations that provide temperature data for Tanzania is sparse. For example, a widely used 
global gridded data set provided by the Climate Research Unit (CRU), hosted by the University of East 
Anglia, uses only three weather stations from Tanzania (Rowhani et al. 2011) – none of them from Kagera. 
This motivates the reliance on re-analysis data. 
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the rainfall data to each village using an inverse distance weighing method.49 The results 
are also robust to using the coarser rainfall data provided in the MERRA data set. 
All weather data sets span the entire study period. I construct the mean monthly 
temperature and rainfall during the previous two rainy seasons. 50 51 As only very few 
households have access to irrigation (see Section 2.2), I expect the weather conditions in 
the growing season to largely determine the contemporaneous incomes. Table 4.1 
provides the summary statistics of the weather variables in the 51 villages in 1994-2009. 
The mean monthly growing season temperature across the villages is 23 °C. The standard 
deviation stands at 1.29 °C but this variation mainly originates from the differences 
between the villages. The within-village standard deviation is only 0.33 °C implying that 
temperatures remain fairly stable over time. The empirical strategies described in Sections 
4.3 and 4.4 exploit this within-village variation in temperatures. Therefore, in what 
follows, I will interpret the impact of temperature shocks with respect to the within-
village standard deviation (0.33 °C).  
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the weather variables in the 51 villages in 
1994-2009 
   std. dev. 
  mean overall 
between 
villages 
within 
villages 
temperature (°C) 22.70 1.29 1.26 0.33 
growing degree days 2706.2 237.6 231.9 60.6 
rainfall (mm) 140.93 68.16 47.8 49.0 
                                                 
49 The method involves estimating rainfall for each village using all available data from the stations. A 
village specific monthly rainfall value is calculated by weighing each monthly rainfall reading with the 
inverse of the distance to the rainfall station where it was recorded. 
50 For temperature this means first calculating the mean daily temperature for each growing season month 
(March, April, May, October, November and December) and then taking the mean over these to construct 
an annual measure. For rainfall, I first calculate the total rainfall for each growing season month and then 
take a mean over these. The results are robust to using growing degree days instead of mean temperatures 
(see below).  
51 Note that within a village all temperature and rainfall readings at any one time are identical. As such, all 
variation at the village level is through time. 
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The agronomical literature often uses growing degree days (GDDs) to capture 
temperature’s apparent non-linear relationship with plant growth (e.g. Ritchie and 
NeSmith 1991). Recent studies in economics and climate change research have also 
adopted this measure (Schlenker, Hanemann, and Fisher 2006, Schlenker and Lobell 
2010a, Burke et al. 2011, Dillon, Mueller, and Salau 2011, Fisher et al. 2012). The 
construction of GDDs involves summing up the number of ‘temperature days’ over the 
growing seasons. 52 Table 3 shows that the mean number of growing degree days in the 
data is 2,706 with a within-village standard deviation of 60.6. This one standard deviation 
corresponds to a year that had 61 growing season days in which the temperature was 1 ° 
C above its long-run mean.53 
The data based on self-reports suggest that weather related shocks are common reasons 
for income fluctuations in Kagera. The 2004 and 2010 rounds collected extensive 
retrospective information about the income shocks experienced by the panel respondents. 
Nearly 60 per cent of the respondents reported to have experienced at least one shock in 
1994-2009. As documented in Chapter 3, the most frequently reported shocks were the 
death of a family member (27% of all shocks), poor harvest due to bad weather (21%) 
and serious illness (19%). 
4.3 Temperature shocks and household consumption 
The econometric analysis begins by estimating the impact of temperature shocks on 
household consumption. I use the four waves of household panel survey administered in 
1991-94. As described in Chapter 2, this baseline survey consisted of 915 households that 
                                                 
52 The literature typically sets two thresholds, one at 8 °C and the other at 32 °C. A day with an average 
temperature of 9 °C counts as one degree day. Similarly, a temperature of 20 °C accounts for 12 degree 
days. Temperatures above 32 °C are considered harmful for plant growth and thus do not contribute to the 
degree days, so the maximum daily value is 24 °C. I adopt these thresholds and then sum the degree days 
over the two growing seasons. 
53 The growing season in Kagera has 184 days. 
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were interviewed up to four times. After dropping the households that were interviewed 
only once and a small number of households with missing consumption data, I am left 
with 3,277 observations from 912 households. 
These early rounds of the survey also collected data on incomes. However, measuring 
income in a context where most households engage in self-employed agriculture is 
difficult and subject to a large margin of error (Deaton 1997). In such a setting, 
consumption has been viewed to provide a more reliable measure of welfare (e.g., Deaton 
and Grosh 2000). This motivates the use of consumption as the outcome variable to 
estimate the impact of weather shocks on household welfare. 54 
The consumption data originate from extensive food and non-food consumption modules 
in the survey. The consumption basket includes 97 food items (home produced and 
purchased) and 36 non-food items. The aggregates are temporally and spatially deflated 
using data from a price questionnaire included in the survey. Consumption is expressed 
in per capita terms using 1991 Tanzanian shillings (Tsh). The recall period was 12 months 
in the first wave (administered usually in 1991 or 1992). The waves 2, 3 and 4 were 
administered 6 to 7 months after the previous wave and therefore the recall period in the 
consumption module was six months. Following Bengtsson (2010) 55, the consumption 
values are normalised by dividing the annual value in wave 1 by two. The mean household 
per capita consumption for the pooled sample is 34,191 Tsh with a standard deviation of 
                                                 
54 The OLS estimate for temperature appears statistically significant and negative when household per 
capita income or agricultural income is used as the outcome variable. However, the estimated impacts are 
implausibly large. The median quantile regression produces more similar (and statistically significant) 
temperature estimates compared to the consumption models. This suggests, as discussed in Bengtsson 
(2010) and confirmed by graphical analysis done by the author (not reported), that the income data are 
characterised by numerous outliers. Therefore the OLS results based on the income data should be 
interpreted with extreme caution. Results of these income regressions are available from the author upon 
request. 
55 Bengtsson (2010) employs the first four waves of the survey to show how child and adult body weights 
respond to temporary changes in household income. 
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26,914 Tsh. The econometric strategy described below controls for any questionnaire 
specific traits and seasonality aspects of consumption through including controls for wave 
and the quarter of year when the interview took place.  
I use a fixed-effects approach (Burke et al. 2011, Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012, Fisher et 
al. 2012, Dell, Jones, and Olken 2013) to identify the effect of temperature changes on 
household consumption. Using household and year fixed effects, the impact of the 
temperature changes is identified from household (or community) specific deviations in 
temperature while controlling for annual shocks common to all villages.  
Building on the work in Bengtsson (2010), the natural log of per capita consumption for 
household ℎ in wave 𝑡 (ln 𝑐ℎ𝑡) is modelled as:  
(4.1) ln 𝑐ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑇ℎ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅ℎ,𝑡−1 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝑞ℎ𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝜀ℎ𝑡,  
where 𝑡 = 1,…,4. The term 𝑇ℎ,𝑡−1 captures the temperature and 𝑅ℎ,𝑡−1 the rainfall during 
the rainy season months in the 12 months preceding the interview.56 The term 𝑞ℎ𝑡 is a set 
of dummies controlling for the quarter of year when the interview took place. Wave 
dummies are captured by 𝜔𝑡. The term 𝛾ℎ represents household fixed effects capturing 
all time-invariant characteristics of the households. The computed standard errors are 
clustered at the village level.  
Besides the wave fixed effects, the survey design permits the further control for 
unobserved time-variant effects (Bengtsson 2010). First, the wave does not fully 
                                                 
56 I did not find evidence of a non-linear (quadratic) relationship between the weather variables and 
consumption. This motivates the focus on the linear specification here. Moreover, the within-
transformation makes the interpretation of the quadratic terms cumbersome in the fixed effect models (see 
McIntosh and Schlenker 2006). 
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correspond to the month or even to the calendar year of the interview. This was because 
the survey team visited the baseline villages at different times of the year and sometimes 
even in different calendar years within waves. 57 For example, in the first wave, 47 per 
cent of the households were interviewed in 1991, 50 per cent in 1992 and 3 per cent in 
1993.58 Furthermore, the weather variables are constructed so that they capture the 
conditions in the growing season months in the 12 months prior to the interview month. 
These two features induce additional random cross-sectional variation to the data. The 
first additional specification includes a set of year dummies (𝜃𝑡) that capture any macro-
level shocks specific to the calendar year. I then replace these with district by year 
interaction terms (𝑑ℎ ∗ 𝜃𝑡). 
59 While these interaction terms capture district specific 
trends, such as district level price effects, they come with a cost of absorbing a large 
amount of the variation in the temperature data. 
Table 4.2 reports the results. The first three columns contain the estimates for equation 
(4.1) using mean monthly growing season temperature in the past 12 months before the 
interview date. Columns 4-6 use growing degree days (GDDs). Furthermore, columns 1 
and 4 control for time effects only through wave dummies. Columns 2 and 5 add the year 
dummies and columns 3 and 6 replace these with district by year interaction terms. The 
temperature variables appear with negative coefficients and are well determined in all 
specifications. The impact of one standard deviation increase (0.33 °C) in average 
monthly growing season temperature decreases household per capita consumption by 4.9 
to 5.5 per cent (on average and ceteris paribus) depending on the specification. In the 
most preferred specification, containing the fixed effects models with year dummies 
                                                 
57 The visits across villages were randomised at the first round of interviews (World Bank 2004).  
58 If a household dropped out from the survey it was replaced with another household. This explains why 
few households were interviewed in 1993.  
59 The 51 villages group into six districts. 
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(column 2), a one standard deviation increase in temperature decreases household per 
capita consumption by 4.9 per cent. The 95 per cent confidence interval for this negative 
effect is [0.9; 8.8]. The specifications using GDDs report similar impacts. In column 5 
we see that a one standard deviation (60.6) increase in the previous year’s growing degree 
days causes a 4.8 per cent fall in per capita consumption (on average and ceteris paribus). 
Columns 3 and 6 include the district-by-year interaction terms. The coefficients on the 
temperature variables (mean temperature and GDDs) are of similar magnitude as in other 
columns, although, as expected, somewhat less precisely estimated (p<0.10). This implies 
that the channel through which temperature affects consumption is not mediated through 
the local price effects. Furthermore, following Harari and La Ferrara (2012), I also 
estimated Equation (4.1) using weather variables that capture the dry season (or off-
season) temperature and rainfall. These variables did not exert independent effects on 
household consumption further supporting the notion that temperature affects 
consumption through the agricultural yield channel. 60 This conjecture is in line with two 
recent studies from Tanzania. Ahmed et al. (2011) and Rowhani et al. (2011) use regional 
level data on agricultural yields and document how positive temperature deviations have 
a large negative impact on yields. 61 
Rainfall appears with a significant, and economically meaningful, coefficient only when 
logged and when temperature is excluded from the specification. In addition, using 
natural logs instead of raw values of mean temperature and rainfall provides qualitatively 
similar results. 62  
                                                 
60 The results are not reported but are available upon request. 
61 The production functions in these two studies also include rainfall but similar to the results in this essay, 
it exerts only a negligible independent impact on yields.  
62 The regression results of rainfall only and log transformed weather variables are not reported but available 
upon request. 
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Table 4.2: Impact of temperature changes on household consumption 
dependent variable: 
(logged) household per 
capita consumption 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
mean temperature growing degree days (GDD) a) 
temperature (°C or GDD)  -0.148** -0.147** -0.168* -0.008** -0.008** -0.009* 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.095) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
rainfall (mm)  -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
household fixed effects  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
χ2 (869) = 5681.2 
year dummies  
no yes no no yes no 
χ2 (2) =  4.87 
district by year 
interactions  no no yes no no yes 
χ2 (17) = 51.03 
wave dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
χ2 (3) = 121.9 
quarter of year dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
χ2 (3) = 2.82 
Number of observations 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.176 0.190 0.175 0.177 0.190 
R2 0.177 0.179 0.195 0.177 0.179 0.195 
a ) The growing degree day variable has been divided by 10 to facilitate interpretation. 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the 
village level. Mean temperature (columns 1-3) is measured as average monthly growing 
season temperature (in °C) 12 months before the interview month. Growing degree days 
(columns 4-6) are measured as growing degree days 12 months before the interview month.  
Rainfall is measured as average monthly growing season rainfall (in mm) 12 months before 
the interview month. The Wald tests compare the sum of squared residuals between the 
restricted and unrestricted models. These tests are based on the model presented in Column 3 
(except in the case of year dummies). 
 
Finally, the OLS approach implicitly assumes that temperature exerts a similar impact 
across the entire consumption distribution. The validity of this assumption was tested by 
estimating a pooled model with village and year dummies using quantile regression 
techniques. Appendix C presents the results. According to the inter-quintile tests the 
differences between the coefficients at the lower and upper quintiles are not statistically 
different from zero. Furthermore, since the quantile regression method focuses only on 
the sign and not the size (as OLS) of the residual, it is less sensitive to outliers in data and 
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departures from normality (e.g., Koenker and Hallock 2001). As the median and the 
corresponding OLS regression produce broadly similar temperature coefficients it is 
unlikely that outliers are driving the results reported in Table 4.2.  
These estimated impacts are large but broadly comparable to what have been documented 
in the recent empirical literature based on aggregated macro-level data. In an influential 
paper, Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) investigate the within-country impact of annual 
temperature deviations on economic growth. Employing a cross-country panel spanning 
1950-2003 with country and region by year fixed effects, the authors find that a 1 °C 
increase in annual temperature reduces annual GDP growth rate on average by 1.3 
percentage points in poor countries. 63 This negative impact is larger (1.9 percentage 
points) when the sample is constrained to Sub-Saharan African countries.  
Schlenker and Lobell (2010a) use cross-country panel data based on Sub-Saharan African 
countries from 1961 to 2007 to study the impact of temperature fluctuations on five key 
staple crops. Their model estimates, based on country fixed effects and quadratic time 
trends, suggest that a one degree increase in the growing season temperature decreases 
average Maize yields (tons/ha) by 10 per cent, Sorghum yields by 6 per cent, Millet yields 
by 9 per cent, Groundnut yields by 8 per cent and Cassava yields by 7 per cent (Schlenker 
and Lobell 2010b). The estimated impacts were even larger for South-Africa and 
Zimbabwe, two countries characterised by higher fertilizer use. 
Burke et al. (2011) employ an African cross-country panel from 1961 to 2008 to study 
the impact of annual temperature deviations on Maize yields. Using country and year 
                                                 
63 Dell et al. define a country as poor if the PPP GDP per capita is below the median in the first year in the 
data. 
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fixed effects, the authors find that a 1 °C increase in average growing season temperature 
reduces maize yields on average by 10 to 30 per cent depending on the specification.   
The foregoing has established that temperature shocks induce considerable fluctuations 
in household consumption. The next section analyses the impact of these income shocks 
on long-term migration decisions. 
4.4 Migration and weather shocks 
4.4.1 Econometric strategy 
I employ event history analysis based on discrete time methods (Allison 1982, Jenkins 
1995). The model allows for the inclusion of time-varying explanatory variables, such as 
temperature and rainfall. It also accommodates the apparent (independent) censoring of 
the data. The procedure involves the transformation of the data to person-year level. I 
consider mobility between 1994 and 2009.64 Furthermore, given the age restriction, 
individuals enter the data set when they turn 15 and leave when they migrate or turn 40. 
This yields an unbalanced data set of 24,962 person-year observations. The total number 
of individuals is 3,240 (1,662 women and 1,578 men) with 1,480 right censored 
individuals, those who had not migrated by 2009. Because the migration motives are 
different for men and women, the analysis is separated by gender.65 
The event history analysis typically adopts the logit model. The logit model constraints 
the probability to a [0,1] interval by assuming a cumulative density function (CDF) that 
follows a logistic distribution. Here the estimated model can be formulated as: 
                                                 
64 The 2010 migration module asked about mobility between 1994 and 2010. The 2010 fieldwork began in 
April and the last interviews were held in December. Since 2010 was not a full year, I exclude it from the 
analysis. 
65 Also the data support the separation by gender. A likelihood ratio test akin to Chow (1960) with one 
degree of freedom yields a χ2 test statistic of 89.0 (p=0.000).   
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(4.2) ln [
𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑡
1 − 𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑡
] = 𝑥𝑖𝑣𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜗𝑣.  
The out-migration event of an individual 𝑖 is captured by the binary variable 𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑡 that 
assumes a value 1 if the person migrates from village 𝑣 at a year 𝑡, and zero otherwise. 
The term 𝜗𝑣 represents a set of village dummies and 𝛿𝑡 year dummies. As for the 
consumption specification, the standard errors are clustered at the village level. 
The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑣𝑡 captures individual and household level characteristics affecting an 
individual’s probability of migrating. The time varying variables include dummies for 
education and mean monthly growing season temperature 66 and rainfall in the previous 
year. The changing risks of migrating associated with age are modelled using age 
dummies. 67 The time invariant variables are measured from responses in wave 1 
administered before 1994. They include an individual's gender and relationship to the 
household head, head's age and gender, land size and the demographic composition of the 
household. Table 4.3 provides the summary statistics of these covariates. The reason for 
not controlling for initial consumption (or income) is that it is likely to be highly 
correlated with current income or consumption (which I do not observe). This would 
make the interpretation of the weather variables as income shocks cumbersome.68 
  
                                                 
66 As for the consumption regressions, using growing degree days instead of mean temperature produces 
qualitatively similar results. Results are not reported but available from the author. 
67 The results are robust to using an age specific spline variable instead of dummies. The dummy variable 
approach is preferred here to facilitate the interpretation of the age effects. 
68 Nevertheless, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the initial consumption variable in the model. 
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics 
 mean std. dev. 
Time-variant variables:   
temperature (°C)  22.61 1.290 
rainfall (mm) 139.6 67.78 
age in years 23.90 6.735 
less than primary education (reference) 0.297 0.457 
primary education 0.656 0.475 
secondary education 0.046 0.210 
Time-invariant variables: *   
male 0.530 0.499 
head or spouse 0.127 0.332 
child of head 0.583 0.493 
grandchild of head 0.115 0.319 
other relation to the head (reference) 0.175 0.380 
male head   0.786 0.410 
age of the head 47.95 16.10 
land size (acres) 5.086 5.017 
number of males 0-5 years 0.715 0.877 
number of males 6-15 years 1.301 1.158 
number of males 16-60 years 1.426 1.020 
number of males 61+ years 0.187 0.390 
number of females 0-5 years 0.737 0.916 
number of females 6-15 years 1.315 1.292 
number of females 16-60 years 1.769 1.257 
number of females 61+ years 0.184 0.403 
Number of person-years 24,962  
* measured in wave 1 (usually administered in 1991 or 1992) 
 
The identification strategy here is similar to the fixed effects approach employed in 
Section 4.3. Village dummies absorb the spatial variation in these data, so only the within-
village variation in temperatures over time is exploited. The year dummies control for 
any annual macro-level shocks common to all villages.69  
                                                 
69 The results are robust to using the spell at risk variable instead of the year dummies (see Section 0).  
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4.4.2 Results 
Table 4.4 provides the results for men. The odd columns show the log-odd ratios and the 
even columns the marginal effects. The first two columns provide the results without 
village dummies where the weather variables are constructed as deviations from village 
mean. The remaining four columns show the results with the village dummies included. 
The estimates are broadly similar across the models with (Columns 3-6) and without 
village dummies (Columns 1-2) suggesting that the estimated impacts on variables 
capturing the individual level characteristics are not influenced by the time invariant 
village characteristics. Focusing first on the control variables, we see that, as anticipated, 
education increases the risk of migrating. The coefficients on the age dummies reflect the 
age pattern observed in Figure 4.3. Furthermore, the ties to the household head are 
important predictors of migration. Other things equal, the closer the familial ties are to 
the head the less likely the individual is to migrate. This finding is line with previous 
research in Tanzania (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2011) and Malawi (Beegle and 
Poulin 2013).  
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 Table 4.4: Impact of temperature changes on migration among males 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 log-odds mfx  log-odds mfx  log-odds mfx  
temperature § -0.487*** -0.026*** -0.448*** -0.023*** -0.434*** -0.020*** 
 (0.141) (0.008) (0.138) (0.007) (0.136) (0.006) 
rainfall § -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
secondary education 0.315*** 0.017*** 0.338*** 0.018*** 0.366*** 0.017*** 
 (0.110) (0.006) (0.111) (0.006) (0.126) (0.006) 
primary education 1.624*** 0.085*** 1.674*** 0.087*** 1.597*** 0.074*** 
 (0.150) (0.007) (0.160) (0.008) (0.170) (0.008) 
less than primary educ reference reference reference reference reference reference 
age: 15-19 reference reference reference reference reference reference 
age: 20-24 -0.064 -0.003 -0.029 -0.002 0.123 0.006 
 (0.125) (0.007) (0.124) (0.006) (0.136) (0.006) 
age: 25-29 -0.641*** -0.034*** -0.592*** -0.031*** -0.364** -0.017** 
 (0.154) (0.008) (0.160) (0.008) (0.163) (0.008) 
age: 30-34 -0.775*** -0.041*** -0.748*** -0.039*** -0.541*** -0.025*** 
 (0.156) (0.009) (0.159) (0.008) (0.174) (0.008) 
age: 35-39 -1.020*** -0.054*** -0.992*** -0.052*** -0.778*** -0.036*** 
 (0.223) (0.012) (0.224) (0.012) (0.224) (0.010) 
head or spouse -0.684*** -0.036*** -0.684*** -0.036*** -0.701*** -0.032*** 
 (0.215) (0.011) (0.219) (0.011) (0.219) (0.010) 
child of head -0.701*** -0.037*** -0.635*** -0.033*** -0.707*** -0.033*** 
 (0.101) (0.005) (0.104) (0.005) (0.107) (0.005) 
grandchild of head -0.308** -0.016** -0.316** -0.016** -0.415*** -0.019*** 
 (0.139) (0.007) (0.142) (0.007) (0.150) (0.007) 
other relation to the head reference reference reference reference reference reference 
household level controls Yes yes yes 
village dummies No yes yes 
year dummies Yes yes yes 
Sample full full educ migrants dropped 
Observations 13,225 13,225 12,699 
Pseudo-Log likelihood -2,746.613 -2,685.366 -2,358.522 
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
§ = constructed as deviation from the mean in columns 1 and 2. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the village level. The standard errors for the marginal effects 
(mfx) are calculated using the delta-method. 
Temperature is measured as average monthly growing season temperature (in °C) in the previous year. 
Rainfall is measured as average monthly growing season rainfall (in mm) in the previous year. 
The household level controls are measured in wave (i.e. before 1994) and include head’s characteristics 
(gender, age and education), household composition (number of males and females of certain age) and 
land ownership (acres). 
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The attention now shifts to the weather variables. As predicted by the theoretical model, 
we see that an increase in the mean temperature in the previous year’s growing season 
decreases the probability of migrating. In column 4, a one standard deviation (0.33 °C) 
increase in the previous year’s average monthly growing season temperature decreases 
the probability of migrating by 0.76 of a percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus. 
This corresponds to a reduction in the overall male migration rate of about 13 per cent. 70 
The estimate is well determined. Columns 5 and 6 show the results when the individuals 
who reported migrating because of education are dropped from the sample. The 
coefficient on the temperature variable is of similar magnitude and remains significant at 
the one per cent level. This implies that individuals migrating because of schooling are 
not driving the results obtained. Rainfall in the previous year’s growing season does not 
exert an independent impact on migration decisions.  
Table 4.5 provides the results for women. Similar to men, the likelihood of leaving 
increases with education. Also the age patterns correspond to the age specific hazard rates 
presented in Figure 4.4. The temperature variable appears with a negative sign in all 
columns but the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. This confirms 
the established prior that female migration is less responsive to income shocks induced 
by weather due to the fact that it is largely motivated by marriage and family. As for men, 
the results are not sensitive to dropping the education migrants from the sample. 
  
                                                 
70 The overall male migration rate is 5.8 per cent (see Figure 4.5).  
92 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Impact of temperature changes on migration among females 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 log-odds mfx  log-odds mfx  log-odds mfx  
temperature § -0.014 -0.001 -0.015 -0.001 -0.027 -0.002 
 (0.189) (0.014) (0.188) (0.014) (0.195) (0.014) 
rainfall § -0.001* -0.000* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
secondary education 0.264*** 0.020*** 0.295*** 0.022*** 0.288*** 0.021*** 
 (0.073) (0.006) (0.083) (0.006) (0.083) (0.006) 
primary education 0.843*** 0.064*** 0.804*** 0.061*** 0.580*** 0.042*** 
 (0.128) (0.009) (0.149) (0.011) (0.184) (0.013) 
less than primary educ reference reference Reference reference reference reference 
age: 15-19 reference reference Reference reference reference reference 
age: 20-24 0.097 0.007 0.138 0.010 0.115 0.008 
 (0.097) (0.007) (0.104) (0.008) (0.113) (0.008) 
age: 25-29 -0.398*** -0.030*** -0.328** -0.025** -0.301** -0.022** 
 (0.133) (0.010) (0.140) (0.011) (0.139) (0.010) 
age: 30-34 -0.676*** -0.051*** -0.603*** -0.045*** -0.534*** -0.038*** 
 (0.134) (0.010) (0.145) (0.011) (0.145) (0.010) 
age: 35-39 -1.175*** -0.089*** -1.109*** -0.083*** -1.031*** -0.074*** 
 (0.215) (0.016) (0.219) (0.017) (0.220) (0.016) 
head or spouse -0.781*** -0.059*** -0.905*** -0.068*** -0.943*** -0.068*** 
 (0.182) (0.014) (0.180) (0.013) (0.183) (0.013) 
child of head -0.016 -0.001 -0.017 -0.001 -0.051 -0.004 
 (0.094) (0.007) (0.101) (0.008) (0.105) (0.008) 
grandchild of head  0.079 0.006 0.072 0.005 0.028 0.002 
 (0.133) (0.010) (0.145) (0.011) (0.148) (0.011) 
other relation to the head reference reference Reference reference reference reference 
household level controls yes yes yes 
village dummies no yes yes 
year dummies yes yes yes 
Sample full full educ migrants dropped 
Observations 11,737 11,737 11,377 
Pseudo-Log likelihood -3,261.807 -3,225.630 -3,023.916 
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
§ = constructed as deviation from the mean in columns 1 and 2. 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the village level. The standard errors for the marginal effects 
(mfx) are calculated using the delta-method. 
Temperature is measured as average monthly growing season temperature (in °C) in the previous year. 
Rainfall is measured as average monthly growing season rainfall (in mm) in the previous year. 
The household level controls are measured in wave (i.e. before 1994) and include head’s characteristics 
(gender, age and education), household composition (number of males and females of certain age) and 
land ownership (acres). 
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4.5 Robustness 
The village and year fixed effects absorb a considerable amount of the variation in the 
weather data. The village fixed effects are vital so that the effect of temperature is 
identified from the village-specific deviations rather than from differences in mean 
temperature levels between villages. The duration modelling framework, however, offers 
an alternative method to model time to migration. The spell at risk captures the number 
of elapsed years since the individual entered the data at time 𝑡. 71 Since individuals enter 
the data set at different calendar years, this variable is less correlated with the annual 
weather variables. Appendix D reports estimates for the migration models using the spell 
at risk variable instead of calendar year dummies. First, the likelihood ratio tests show 
that the year dummies provide the best fit to the data. Among the spell at risk 
specifications, the higher order polynomials provide the best fit and yield similar 
temperature coefficients to the ones presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5.  
A concern in the heavy use of village fixed effects is that perhaps some of these observed 
effects are originating from a single village that does not conform to the general pattern 
in the region. I addressed this issue by re-running the consumption and migration 
regressions by omitting each village in turn. Appendix E shows how the temperature 
coefficients remain stable across these 51 regressions.  
Finally, the migration regressions presented in Section 4.4 include controls at the 
individual level but do not fully control for (time-invariant) individual heterogeneity. To 
address this concern, the odd columns in Table F.1 of Appendix F repeat Column 4 in 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 but using the linear probability model (LPM). The use of this 
model allows the introduction of individual-level fixed effects. First, columns 1 and 3 
                                                 
71 The spell year variable records a value of 1 in the 1st year, and 2 in the 2nd year and so forth.  
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show that the LPM produces identical marginal effect estimates to those reported for the 
logit in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. The results are thus not sensitive to the choice of the 
underlying statistical model (logit or LPM). The even columns replace the village fixed 
effects with individual level fixed effects. As expected, the use of individual level fixed 
effects inflates the standard errors but otherwise the coefficients on the weather variables 
appear broadly similar. This implies that unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity does 
not appear to be driving the results obtained.   
4.6 What about the long-run weather variability? 
The primary focus of this essay is to analyse the impact of ex post temperature shocks on 
long-run migration decisions. The New Economics of Labour Migration (Stark and 
Bloom 1985, Rosenzweig and Stark 1989) posits that in an environment characterised by 
large weather uncertainty households engage in strategic migration. More specifically, 
households send migrants to areas where the variability of income is not correlated with 
the variability of income at the origin. The purpose of this section is to study whether this 
hypothesis holds in the Tanzanian context.  
The econometric strategy in this essay has modelled migration decisions using village 
fixed effects. In these models, the long-run variability of temperature and rainfall are 
absorbed in the fixed effect. Next I retrieve the fixed effect (𝜗𝑣) from Equation (4.2) and 
decompose it to an unknown part (unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity) and to a part 
associated with long-run temperature and rainfall variability.72 In the first stage, I use the 
LPM and re-run regression based on Equation (4.2) without the time-varying temperature 
and rainfall variables. In the second stage, I regress the retrieved village level fixed on 
the long run variability of temperature and rainfall while controlling for the elevation of 
                                                 
72 Earlier research has also used this type of approach to study the role of time-invariant variables in fixed 
effect models  (see e.g., Reilly and Witt 1996, Falco et al. 2011). 
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the village. If households engage in strategic migration we should expect to see higher 
out-migration rates in villages characterised by larger long-run weather variability. 
I measure the long-run variability using the coefficient of variation (CV) based on 
temperature and rainfall data spanning 1981-2010. 73 Table 4.6 presents the results. The 
odd columns provide the results for OLS regressions. In the even columns I use the 
standard errors from the first stage as weights. This Weighted Least Squares approach 
gives more weight to villages that had a more precisely estimated coefficient in the first 
stage. The first two columns in Table 4.6 provides the results for men and the last two 
columns for women. We see that long-run weather variability is not associated with 
higher or lower out-migration rates in any of the columns. These results suggest, similar 
to the findings in Chapter 3, that migration is not a strategic household level decision to 
spread risk in this context. 74 
  
                                                 
73 CV is constructed as the standard deviation divided by the mean. 
74 This finding is robust to 1) omitting the elevation variable from the second stage, 2) restricting the right 
hand side variables in the first stage only to village and year dummies and 3) using mean and standard 
deviation instead of CV. These results are not reported but available from the author.  
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Table 4.6: Decomposing the Fixed Effect 
 means Males females 
  OLS WLS OLS WLS 
CV of temperature 0.300 -0.860 -0.852 0.216 0.194 
 [0.128] (0.925) (0.926) (0.965) (0.983) 
  ((1.113)) ((1.136)) ((0.821)) ((0.837)) 
CV of rainfall 0.019 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.012 
 [0.004] (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
  ((0.020)) ((0.020)) ((0.030)) ((0.030)) 
elevation in km 1.332 -0.031 -0.030 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.163] (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
  ((0.017)) ((0.017)) ((0.022)) ((0.022)) 
intercept  0.111*** 0.109*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) 
  ((0.029)) ((0.030)) ((0.036)) ((0.037)) 
Observations  51 51 51 51 
R2  0.067 0.063 0.003 0.004 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Dependent variable: Fixed effect (𝜗𝑣) from a LPM regression based on Equation (4.2) 
but without rainfall and temperature variables. 
Standard deviations are in square brackets, standard errors in parenthesis and robust 
standard errors in double-parenthesis. 
WLS: Weighted Least Squares model using the standard errors in the first stage model 
as weights.  CV: coefficient of variation in 1981-2010. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
A rapidly emerging literature documents how economic outcomes in African countries 
co-move with temperature. Previous studies use panel data aggregated to a country level 
(e.g., Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012, Burke et al. 2011, Schlenker and Lobell 2010a). This 
study is the first one that takes the analysis to a micro-level using household level panel 
data from rural Tanzania. The fixed effects model confirms the findings from the macro-
level studies. Household consumption is highly responsive to temperature changes in 
Kagera with a one standard deviation increase in the mean monthly growing season 
temperature decreasing household per capita consumption by 4.9 per cent. 
97 
 
 
 
Due to the lack of reliable data on agricultural yields, I am not able to conclusively isolate 
the mechanism in which temperature changes affect consumption outcomes. The fact that 
off-season temperatures do not exert an impact on consumption suggests that the 
mechanism is through the agricultural yield channel. This conjecture is in line with two 
recent studies that use regional level data from Tanzania and report how agricultural 
yields co-move strongly with temperatures (Rowhani et al. 2011, Ahmed et al. 2011).  
Temperature shocks also inhibit internal migration. Each year, five to eight per cent of 
potential migrants leave their village to look for work or for other reasons. This type of 
geographical mobility is associated with large income gains and presents one of the main 
routes out of poverty in rural Tanzania (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2011, 
Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Todo 2013). A one standard deviation increase in the 
growing season temperature causes a 13 per cent reduction in the overall male migration 
rate, ceteris paribus and on average. This result implies that liquidity constraints bind in 
this Tanzanian context. Female migration is unaffected by temperature changes possibly 
due to the fact that it is largely motivated by marriage and family. 
These findings highlight the importance of temperature changes on welfare both at the 
individual and household level in Sub-Saharan Africa. The uninsured income shocks 
inhibit young adults from tapping into the opportunities brought about by geographical 
mobility.  
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5 Essay 3: Measuring catch-up growth in 
malnourished populations 
This essay is forthcoming in Annals of Human Biology  
(DOI: 10.3109/03014460.2013.827239) 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Growth faltering in developing countries typically begins in the first three months of life 
and persists until the age of two or three (Eveleth and Tanner 1976, Shrimpton et al. 2001, 
Victora et al. 2010). This is usually caused by insufficient or poor nutrition or by 
infectious diseases (Golden 1994). Since children are growing rapidly during these years, 
even a short retarded growth spell in this period quickly leads children to fall behind from 
their fast growing peers (Shrimpton et al. 2001, Victora et al. 2010). To bounce back to 
their original growth curves, short and stunted children need to experience higher growth 
rates than their healthy and well-nourished peers. 
In the clinical and epidemiological literature, such catch-up growth is defined as height 
velocity that is above the expected for the child's age and occurs after a period of growth 
retardation (Tanner 1981, Williams 1981, Ashworth and Millward 1986, Boersma and 
Wit 1997). A complete catch-up takes place if the original, pre-retardation, growth curve 
is attained (Williams 1981, Ashworth and Millward 1986). Height-for-age z-score (HAZ) 
measures the distance in height to the median child of a healthy and well-nourished 
population providing the exact empirical counterpart for this definition. An increase in 
HAZ means that height velocity is above what is expected for child's age and gender.  
Recent literature has studied the existence of catch-up growth by regressing adult or pre-
adolescent height on early childhood height (e.g. Martorell et al. 1992, Hoddinott and 
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Kinsey 2001, Fedorov and Sahn 2005, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006, Victora 
et al. 2008, Mani 2012, Outes and Porter 2013). This essay demonstrates that these tests 
misinterpret catch-up growth with within-population convergence. Such convergence 
occurs if short and stunted children experience faster growth than others or taller children 
grow at a slower pace than others – or because of some combination of both. By 
regressing current height on early childhood height researchers cannot tell whether 
children are catching-up or faltering. Moreover, by focusing on the movement within the 
population these regressions fail to capture catch-up growth at the population level. The 
interpretation of these regression coefficients is further hampered by regression-to-the-
mean (Friedman 1992, Quah 1993). 
The evidence on catch-up growth is further limited due to the scarcity of longitudinal data 
sets that follow children over their entire childhood (Eckhardt, Gordon-Larsen, and Adair 
2005). The empirical part of this essay provides new evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Using a 19-year longitudinal data set for the Kagera region in Tanzania, I find 
considerable catch-up growth. The mean HAZ-score in the cohort improves from -1.86 
in early childhood to -1.20 in adulthood. Without catch-up growth, the average girl in the 
sample would have been nearly 5 centimetres shorter in adulthood. For boys, the 
difference between the predicted adult height in early childhood and the actual adult 
height is around 4.5 centimetres. Graphical analysis shows that this catch-up growth takes 
place in puberty. Recently, Coly et al. (2006) and Prentice et al. (2013) documented 
similar extensive pubertal catch-up growth among Senegalese and Gambian children. 
The findings from these three African cohorts challenge the conventional view in the 
literature where catch-up growth after early childhood is difficult and seldom observed 
(e.g. Martorell, Rivera, and Kaplowitz 1990, Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007, Schroeder 
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2008). The results in this essay add to the emerging evidence that puberty offers an 
opportunity window for catch-up growth (Haas and Campirano 2006, Moradi 2010, 
Prentice et al. 2013) and prompt re-thinking the policy recommendation where nutritional 
interventions are only targeted to young children (for a similar point, see Prentice et al. 
2013). Furthermore, a number of studies use adult height as a proxy for health and wealth 
in early childhood (Almond and Currie 2011). The findings in this essay imply that height 
in adulthood may not be such a good indicator of childhood conditions.  
Finally, the pubertal catch-up growth may provide a missing piece to the African height 
puzzle. In a seminal essay, Deaton (2007) shows that, contrary to most other countries in 
the world, disease environment and national income are not good predictors of female 
adult height in African countries. African women are taller than their economic and 
disease environment suggests. Deaton (2007), (Bozzoli, Deaton, and Quintana-Domeque 
(2009)) and Gørgens, Meng, and Vaithianathan (2012) explain this puzzle with a selection 
effect: childhood mortality is concentrated on the genetically short children thus shifting 
the mean adult height right. Moradi (2010; 2012) proposes an alternative explanation that 
African children experience a considerable catch-up growth in puberty. The results 
presented here provide support to this hypothesis.     
The structure of this essay can now be outlined. The next section demonstrates the 
methodological flaws in the recent empirical literature. Section 5.3 provides a brief survey 
of studies employing longitudinal surveys and defining catch-up growth as the change in 
height-for-age z-score. Section 5.4 presents the data used in the empirical analysis. 
Section 5.5 provides the results and section 5.6 analyses the timing of the catch-up growth 
in the Kagera cohort. Section 5.7 concludes. 
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5.2 How not to measure catch-up growth 
Recent empirical literature (Martorell et al. 1992, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001, Fedorov 
and Sahn 2005, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006, Victora et al. 2008, Mani 2012, 
Outes and Porter 2013) subscribes to the definition of catch-up growth used in the medical 
literature but employs regression analysis, usually using the following type of 
specification: 
(5.1) ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,  
where 𝛼 is the intercept and 𝑒𝑖𝑡 the error term. The term ℎ𝑖𝑡 is height (or height-for-age 
z-score) of individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡 and ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 height (or height-for-age z-score) in a 
previous period. In studies that have an access to a sufficiently long data set, t usually 
refers to height measured in adulthood and t-1 to height measured in early childhood. The 
𝛽 coefficient is then interpreted as the measure of catch-up growth. A zero 𝛽 coefficient 
on the lagged height is taken as a complete catch-up: initial height does not predict adult 
height. A coefficient equal to one is interpreted as evidence that no catch-up growth takes 
place: short or stunted children remain locked into their lower growth trajectory. Finally, 
few studies (e.g. Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001) use change in height as the dependent 
variable. This growth specification changes the interpretation of 𝛽 but leads to 
qualitatively identical conclusions about the extent of catch-up growth (see Fedorov and 
Sahn 2005). 
There are a number of problems with the regression approach. Most importantly, these 
tests confuse catch-up growth with within-population convergence. To illustrate this, we 
can express the 𝛽 coefficient as the ratio of covariance between the adult height and initial 
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height, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑥), and the variance of the initial height, 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥), where 𝑦 refers to ℎ𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝑥 to ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1: 
 
(5.2) 
𝛽 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑥)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥)
. 
 
Abstracting from the case when the variance of childhood height approaches infinity, 𝛽 
approaches zero if the covariance between adult height and childhood height approaches 
zero. In other words, 𝛽 approaches zero when childhood height is not a good predictor of 
adult height. Such an outcome is possible if short and stunted children catch-up others – 
or if the growth of the taller children in the sample stagnates. As such, 𝛽 is only picking 
up movements within the HAZ distribution over time but researchers cannot tell whether 
this is due to improvements in HAZ or not.  
Second, as the  𝛽 coefficient focuses on the changes within the distribution it fails to 
capture a widespread catch-up growth in the population. Such uniform movement of the 
distribution (as for example in Figure 5.3 presented later) only affects the estimated 
constant (𝛼), not the 𝛽 coefficient. This is a particular concern if the population under 
scrutiny is largely malnourished. 
Another important caveat is introduced by regression-to-the-mean (even in the absence 
of measurement error). Finding that 𝛽<1 may imply convergence (reduction in the 
dispersion of the height distribution over time) or simply reflect a natural variation in 
growth rates (height distribution remains intact). Quah (1993) demonstrates this 
algebraically using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality: 
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(5.3) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦, 𝑥) ≤ √𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥)√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦). 
 
Now, if there is no convergence or dispersion it follows that: 
(5.4) 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥). 
 
Using this and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in Equation (5.2) gives: 
(5.5) 𝛽 ≤
√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥)√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥)
= 1.  
As such, even when imposing constant variance over time, 𝛽 is smaller than one (the 
equality in the Cauchy-Schwarz holds only in the degenerate case when 𝑥 and 𝑦 are 
linearly dependent). This is why 𝛽<1 does not necessarily imply convergence – let alone 
catch-up growth. It is of no surprise then that most of these studies document partial 
convergence (i.e. 0<𝛽<1). The 𝛽 estimates vary between 0.2 (Fedorov and Sahn 2005) to 
0.7 (Martorell et al. 1992). 
I further demonstrate these concerns using the 1970 British Cohort Study (Elliott and 
Shepherd 2006). The cohort represents a healthy and well-nourished population. By 
default, it does not contain malnourished children and therefore I should not find any 
catch-up growth. Table F.1 of Appendix G contains the summary statistics for the final 
sample of 9,635 individuals. Figure 5.1 provides the distribution of the children's HAZ 
scores in early childhood (solid line) and adulthood (dashed line). As expected, the means 
lie close to zero in both periods and the distributions are virtually on top of each other. 
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Figure 5.1: The evolution of the height-for-age z-scores (HAZ) distribution 
over time in British cohort study (BCS70) 
  
I then estimate Equation (5.1) using height-for-age z-scores (see Appendix H on why 
using raw measures of height is not appropriate here). Table 5.1 presents the regression 
results. The 𝛽 coefficient is estimated as 0.601. The 99 per cent confidence interval for 
this point estimate is [0.578; 0.623]. This finding seriously questions the validity and the 
interpretation of findings in the previous literature using the regression approach to study 
catch-up growth. First, it is inconceivable to find catch-up growth in a healthy and well-
nourished population. The descriptive and graphical analyses also show that there is 
negligible movement in the distribution over time. Yet, the current literature would 
interpret this regression result as partial catch-up growth. Second, a more sensible 
interpretation of the result is convergence in the height distribution (i.e. the dispersion 
diminished over time). This is also not supported by the graphical analysis.   
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Table 5.1: Estimating convergence in the British cohort (BCS70) 
(Dependent variable: HAZ in adulthood) 
 BCS70 
HAZ in early childhood 0.601*** 
 (0.009) 
intercept 0.164*** 
 (0.008) 
Number of observations 9,635 
R2 0.383 
note: *** p<0.01. White (1980) adjusted 
standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
Could this be explained by measurement error? It is true that measurement error in initial 
height (ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1) causes a downward bias, potentially leading to a false inference on 
convergence.  Measurement error in ℎ𝑖,𝑡 is less harmful as it only leads to inflated standard 
errors. These statements hold if we make the plausible assumption that measurement error 
is random (i.e. not correlated with children's characteristics) with zero mean. In Appendix 
I, I show that the magnitude of the potential measurement error is too small to drive the 
results in Table 5.1. 
To further analyse what is going on, in Figure 5.2, I plot HAZ in adulthood on HAZ in 
early childhood. If the nutritional status in early childhood perfectly predicted adult 
outcomes (i.e. children remain locked into their growth trajectories), the regression line 
(dashed line in the figure) would lie on the 45-degree line (solid line). Instead, the 
regression line is flatter. From the figure it becomes clear that this is an outcome of 
regression-to-the-mean: those initially unusually short (the dots lying on the middle-left 
in the figure) and tall (the dots lying on the middle-right) reverted towards the mean by 
adulthood. 
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Figure 5.2: HAZ in adulthood on HAZ in early childhood, the British cohort 
(BCS70) 
 
The economics literature generally augments Equation (5.1) with control variables, such 
as child, household and community characteristics. This shifts the focus from 
unconditional to conditional convergence but does not address any of the criticisms raised 
in this essay. Furthermore, the same literature is concerned with establishing the causal 
effect of initial height on adult height. In the presence of time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics, such as a child's innate healthiness or parental preferences, the lagged 
height variable (ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1) is, by construction, correlated with the error term (𝑒𝑖𝑡). As a result, 
𝛽 captures both the relationship of adult height and early childhood height (i.e. 
convergence) as well as the relationship between adult height and the omitted or 
unobserved variables. The usual strategy is to use instrumental variable (IV) techniques 
to eliminate the role of unobserved omitted characteristics (Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001, 
Fedorov and Sahn 2005, Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006, Mani 2012, Outes and 
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Porter 2013). The approach starts with a quest for variables that are correlated with the 
initial height but not with adult height (other than through initial height). In the first stage, 
these instrumental variables are used to predict the initial height. In the second stage, the 
predictions are plugged into the original equation in order to purge the correlation 
between the error term and the initial height. The IV-approach is not, however, a panacea. 
These IV-estimates continue to measure within-sample convergence. Moreover, the 
approach does not solve the regression-to-the-mean issue (see Quah 1993). Finally, 
researchers often remove the time-invariant unobserved variables from Equation  (5.1) by 
taking first differences and then use an instrument to purge the remaining correlation with 
the lagged height variable and the error term (e.g. Mani 2012, Fedorov and Sahn 2005). 
This is unfortunate as it is precisely the impact of these variables, rather than the 𝛽 
coefficient, that would provide useful information to the health practitioners and policy 
makers (see Durlauf and Quah 1998 for a similar point in the context of economic growth 
analysis). 
5.3 A review of studies measuring catch-up growth as the change in HAZ 
In an influential study, Adair (1999) defines catch-up growth as a recovery from stunting. 
Using the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey from the Philippines, she finds 
that the proportion of the stunted children (HAZ<-2) fell from 63 per cent at the age of 
two years to 50 per cent by the age of 12. Using the NCHS/WHO 1977 growth reference 
to convert heights into HAZ scores, she finds that the mean HAZ scores improved from 
-2.41 at the age of two to -1.94 by the age of 12. As she does not observe the adult heights, 
these catch-up growth estimates provide only tentative evidence of the final catch-up 
growth in the cohort. Later analyses by Eckhardt et al (2005a,b) show that growth 
faltering took place during puberty, especially among females. 
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A small number of studies group children according to their degree of stunting in early 
childhood and compare the height increments from early childhood to adulthood between 
groups and to an external healthy and well-nourished reference population. Martorell, 
Rivera, and Kaplowitz (1990) use data from Guatemala where more than half of the 
children in the sample were stunted at the age of five. These children did not experience 
larger height gains than their American peers if anything, the opposite was true. In 
addition, the authors did not find any marked differences in height increments between 
shorter and taller Guatemalan children. Satyanarayana, Nadamuni Naidu, and Narasinga 
Rao (1980) and Satyanarayana et al. (1981) study growth increments using Indian cohorts 
of boys and girls respectively. They group children according to their severity of stunting 
and compare the height increments between the age of five and 17 across the groups and 
to a longitudinal study from Boston. These Indian boys were not found to experience any 
catch-up growth and also the height gains between the groups were similar 
(Satyanarayana, Nadamuni Naidu, and Narasinga Rao 1980). The initially most 
nutritionally deprived girls (HAZ < -4) were found growing considerably faster than the 
Boston girls and other Indian girls in the same sample (Satyanarayana et al. 1981). This 
result may however be an outcome of measurement error in initial height leading to an 
incorrect grouping of the children. 
Among the very few longitudinal studies from sub-Saharan Africa, Coly et al. (2006) 
follow more than 2,800 Senegalese children for nearly two decades and compare their 
growth rates to the NCHS/WHO 1977 reference. The mean HAZ in early childhood 
among girls -1.3 and among boys was -1.4. By adulthood these means reduced to -0.41 
for girls and -0.58 for boys implying nearly complete catch-up. This widely neglected 
study also makes a clear distinction between catch-up growth relative to a healthy 
reference population (global catch-up growth) and relative to other children in the 
109 
 
 
 
population (local catch-up growth). More recently, Prentice et al. (2013) provided similar 
evidence from Gambia. Exploiting longitudinal data on 160 children whose heights were 
measured multiple times between the ages of 8 and 24 and measuring heights against the 
UK-1990 reference population, they also document nearly complete catch-up growth. The 
mean HAZ among boys improved from -1.25 to -0.5 and from      -1.1 to -0.2 among girls.  
5.4 Data 
I use KHDS for the empirical part of the essay. As discussed in Chapter 1, the sample 
was drawn from a random sample stratified by adult mortality rates in the communities 
and the agro-climatic zones in the region. Statistical tests (not reported but available from 
the author) did not reveal statistical differences in HAZ scores between children residing 
in high or low adult mortality communities.    
Anthropometric measurements were taken from all respondents who were present at the 
time of the household interview. In 1991-94, trained anthropometrists were responsible 
for measuring all household members. In 2004 and 2010, enumerators, carefully trained 
by a qualified nurse, took the measurements usually after the household questionnaire 
was administered in the household. In all survey rounds, heights of children less than 
three years old were measured using a length board with a sliding foot piece. The heights 
of adults and children older than three years were measured using a height board with a 
sliding head piece. All heights were recorded to the nearest millimetre. 
Height-for-age Z-scores were calculated using the zanthro command in Stata 11.2 (see 
Vidmar et al. 2004). I use the US 2000 NCHS/CDC as the reference population (see 
Kuczmarski et al. 2002). The 2006 WHO Child Growth Standards (see WHO 2006) in 
conjunction with the WHO Reference 2007 for 5-19 years  (see de Onis, Onyango, et al. 
2007) resulted in more catch-up growth than NCHS/CDC. This is driven by the 
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differences between the two references. In early childhood (ages 0-5), the median child 
in the WHO Child Growth Standards is taller than in the NCHS/CDC reference 
population (de Onis, Garza, et al. 2007). In adulthood (at the age of 19), however, the 
height difference is negligible when comparing the WHO Reference 2007 for 5-19 years 
and NCHS/CDC. This highlights the difficulty in comparing studies that employ different 
growth standards or reference populations. I prefer the NCHS/CDC growth reference as 
it allows the calculation of HAZ scores from birth to 20 years of age, and is constructed 
using the same reference throughout the entire growth period.  
The sample for this study is constructed from children who were between 12 and 59 
months old at the time of the four waves of the baseline survey in 1991-94 and who are 
at least 18 years old in 2010. This cohort of 884 children is followed from the 1991-94 
rounds through the 2010 round.  In 2010, 559 of these children were interviewed and 
measured, 69 had died and 256 were not found or their heights were not measured. I drop 
all children whose height was not measured in 2010 or whose date of birth is not known. 
After dropping the few children with implausible height measurements    (HAZ< -5 or 
ΔHAZ> ±4) the final sample contains 540 children (269 girls and 271 boys) from 365 
households. If the child was measured more than once when she was 12 to 59 months old 
during the four interview rounds at the baseline, I took the last measurement. An 
alternative strategy would have been to take the mean over these observations to address 
the potential measurement error in these data. This yields nearly identical mean HAZ 
score suggesting that the potential measurement error either has a zero mean or is absent 
in these data. Finally, I use the difference between the date of the interview and the child’s 
date-of-birth to calculate the ages.   
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The sample attrition poses a concern to the analysis. Attrition due to death is less of a 
problem as catch-up growth analysis is focused on the height developments of the 
surviving. Attrition due to other causes is more problematic. If such attrition is positively 
correlated with health, then studies are likely to under-report catch-up growth in the 
sample. To address this, in Table 5.2, I compare children's height-for-age scores by 
attrition status. Children who were not represented in the final sample have slightly higher 
HAZ scores than those who did. A two-tailed t-test shows, however, that this difference 
is not statistically significant. Further examination, presented in Table J.1 of Appendix J, 
reveals that children who deceased after the first round had lower HAZ-scores than those 
who survived and comprise the final sample. Children who were not traced or present at 
the time of the measurement have slightly better HAZ scores than children in the final 
sample. However, according to a two-tailed t-test, neither of these observed differences 
is statistically significant. Sample attrition does not seem to be associated with higher or 
lower HAZ scores. 
Table 5.2: Attrition in KHDS: initial HAZ-scores by sample category 
  KHDS 
final sample no yes 
observations 344 540 
HAZ:    
mean -1.804 -1.864 
std. dev. 1.262 1.155 
difference 0.06 
t-test 0.71 
note: t-test based on Welch t-test on the 
difference in means between the two groups 
Finally, Table J.2 of Appendix J, provides an overview of the HAZ-scores in KHDS by 
migration status for each child in the sample. By 2010, I find that half of the sample had 
migrated. Had we not tracked individuals, I would have lost half of the sample. 
Surprisingly, however, migration does not seem to be correlated with nutrition status. 
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According to a two-tailed t-test, the difference in the adult HAZ-scores between children 
who remained in the baseline village and those who migrated by 2010 is not statistically 
different from zero. 
5.5 Catch-up growth in the Kagera cohort 
Next, I analyse the extent of catch-up growth in the Kagera cohort. As discussed above, 
I measure catch-up growth as the change in HAZ and focus on analysing the data using 
descriptive and graphical methods. Table 5.3 shows the summary statistics for the cohort. 
The mean HAZ scores in 1991-94, when the children are less than five years old, is 1.86 
standard deviations below the median of the US-reference group. Approximately 44 per 
cent of the children are stunted (HAZ < -2) and 16 per cent are severely stunted (HAZ < 
-3). These percentages agree with the statistics reported in the 1991/92 Tanzanian 
Demographic and Health Survey for the same region: 44 per cent of the children under 5 
years old in Kagera were found stunted and 19.5 per cent severely stunted (Ngallaba et 
al. 1993). 
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Table 5.3: Evolution of HAZ scores in the Kagera cohort 
  mean std. dev. 
age in months (t=0) 41.08 14.686 
age in years (t=1) 20.25 1.591 
height (t=0) 89.64 10.269 
height (t=1) 161.7 8.267 
HAZ1 (t=0) -1.86 1.155 
HAZ2 (t=1) -1.20 1.002 
difference in HAZ: 0.66 1.07 
t-test: HAZt=0 = HAZ t=1 10.01 
percentage: HAZ t=0 < -2  44% 
percentage: HAZ t=1 < -2 20% 
percentage: HAZ t=0 < -3 16% 
percentage: HAZ t=1 < -3 3% 
Observations 540 
note: t=0 refers to early childhood, t=1 to adulthood. HAZ scores 
calculated using the US 2000 NCHS/CDC as the reference population. 
 
Interestingly, in 2010, the cohort has been able to catch-up with the reference group: the 
mean height-for-age z-score in the sample is now -1.20. In 2010, 20 per cent are stunted 
and only three per cent severely stunted. There is also a gender difference. The mean 
HAZ-score in the female sample increases from -1.71 to -0.98 whereas for males the 
catch-up growth is somewhat more modest: mean HAZ increases from -2.01 to -1.42. 
These statistics show that the Kagera children are able to catch-up the growth losses 
incurred in early childhood. Figure 5.3 shows the full distributions of the HAZ scores in 
both periods. The figure reinforces the summary statistics: there is considerable catch-up 
growth in the sample. This can be seen as the adult height distribution shifting right 
relative to the early childhood distribution.  
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Figure 5.3: The evolution of the HAZ distribution over time in Kagera cohort 
 
Figure 5.4 offers another cut of the data. Here I plot the change in HAZ on HAZ in early 
childhood. The horizontal line goes through zero. The dots above this line are children 
whose HAZ score improved between the two periods. The dots below this line belong to 
children whose HAZ score worsened. The figure also contains a vertical line that goes 
through zero. The dots on the left of this line belong to children who had a negative HAZ 
score in early childhood. The top left corner (marked with A) contains the children who 
experienced catch-up growth: after initial growth retardation (HAZt-1 < 0), they 
experienced growth that was above what was expected for their age (ΔHAZ > 0). This 
corner corresponds directly to the definition of catch-up growth used in the clinical and 
epidemiological literature. 
Figure 5.4 shows that 95 per cent of Kagera children had negative HAZ scores when they 
were first measured. More than 74 per cent of the sample experienced catch-up growth. 
The mean improvement in HAZ scores among these children is 1.1 units of standard 
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deviation (median = 0.97). Nearly 21 per cent of the children had negative HAZ-scores 
in early childhood and fell further behind later in life. Only five per cent of the children 
had initially positive HAZ-scores. Most of these children experienced slower growth than 
was expected. 
Figure 5.4: Change in HAZ between early childhood and adulthood on HAZ in 
early childhood the Kagera cohort (KHDS) 
 
Note: 
A: under-nourished and growing B: well-nourished and growing 
C: under-nourished and faltering D: well-nourished and faltering 
 
5.6 Timing of the catch-up growth in the Kagera cohort 
The analysis in the previous section finds considerable catch-up growth in the KHDS 
cohort. Coly et al. (2006) find that the near complete catch-up growth documented in the 
Senegalese cohort takes place in puberty. In a recent study combining longitudinal and 
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cross-sectional data from rural Gambia, Prentice et al. (2013) show how children 
experience substantial catch-up growth during puberty.  
To analyse the timing of the catch-up growth in the Kagera cohort, I would need to 
compare growth rates at different points in childhood. Unfortunately, assessing children's 
annual growth patterns is not feasible using the longitudinal data as I only have two or 
three data points for each child. Fortunately, I can use the cross-sectional data to mimic 
children's growth patterns (see Moradi, 2010, for a similar exercise using data for Cote 
d'Ivoire and Ghana). Using the baseline data in 1991-94, I constructed mean HAZ-scores 
at each age until the age of 23. To account for concerns that the observed catch-up growth 
in these cross-sectional data is an artefact of selective mortality (see Bozzoli, Deaton, and 
Quintana-Domeque 2009, Rouanet 2011), I drop all children who did not survive to their 
18th birthday. This mortality information originates from the 2010 survey when the panel 
respondents are adults. Figure 5.5 shows the growth patterns for both gender groups (solid 
lines). Similar to the evidence presented in Shrimpton et al. (2001), growth retardation 
begins immediately after birth and continues until 2-3 years of life. After four years of 
age, the HAZ-scores remain relatively stable until the age of 10 to 11. At this age, the 
median child in the US reference group enters the adolescent growth spurt. The HAZ-
scores fall rapidly at this point suggesting that puberty is delayed for the Kagera children. 
For boys, the HAZ-scores continue to fall until the age of 15 at which point the HAZ-
curve shoots up. The growth ceases at the age of 19 for girls and at the age of 22 for boys. 
By now boys have caught-up the height losses incurred during puberty but HAZ-scores 
have also improved further to nearly restore their early childhood levels. Girls begin their 
adolescent growth spurt earlier and are able to completely restore their initial growth 
curves.  
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The shortcoming of using cross-sectional data to construct growth curves is that I cannot 
be sure whether the observed growth patterns are driven by age or by birth cohort effects. 
That is, whether the observed differences between the age cohorts are arising because 
they are observed at different ages (age effect) or because they were born into different 
environmental conditions (birth cohort effect). To circumvent this, I exploit the 
longitudinal feature of the data and plot the growth curves for the same children whose 
pre-adult HAZ-scores I have in the later rounds of the survey (i.e. 2004 and 2010 rounds). 
These are the two dashed lines in Figure 5.5 starting at the age of 11. These curves lie 
very close to the original growth curves lending support to the age effects story. The three 
longitudinal data observations further confirm these patterns. At the average age of three, 
the mean HAZ score for girls is -1.71 and for boys is -2.02. In puberty (average age of 
14), girls' mean HAZ score has improved to -1.25 and boys' to -1.89. In adulthood, the 
girls' mean HAZ score stands at -0.98 and boys' at -1.42.  
This evidence shows that puberty is an important opportunity window for the Kagera 
children to catch-up their healthy and well-nourished peers. Moreover, this growth pattern 
does not seem to be cohort specific.  
The finding is in tune with recently emerging evidence from studies employing cross-
sectional data sets suggesting that puberty is a sensitive period for children's growth. 
Interestingly, most of this evidence is from studies analysing populations originating from 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Moradi (2010), using multivariate regression analysis and a sample 
of more than 200,000 women from Sub-Saharan Africa, finds that economic growth has 
a positive effect on adult height during early childhood but also during puberty. Akresh 
et al. (2012) provide indirect evidence on this by comparing female adult heights between 
cohorts exposed to the Nigerian civil war in 1967-70. Strikingly, they find that the most 
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negatively affected children were the ones aged 13 to 16 during the war. Economic 
historians have documented intense pubertal catch-up growth among 19th century 
African Americans. In a famous study, Steckel (1987) documents a remarkable catch-up 
growth of African American slaves during puberty. Using manifests of 50,000 slaves 
transported in 1820-1860, he shows that children remain highly malnourished until 
puberty during which the height deficit to an external reference population halved. This 
catch-up is credited to improved diets when the slaves entered the labour force between 
eight and 12 years (Steckel, 1987; 2000) . Komlos (1992) documents similar catch-up 
growth among free African Americans in Antebellum Maryland. 
 
Figure 5.5: HAZ scores by age (cross-sectional data) in Kagera (KHDS) 
 
Note: The dashed curves are less smooth because of fewer observations. 
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Among studies based on non-African populations, Stein (1975) shows that children 
exposed to the Dutch Winter Famine in 1944-1945 were able to completely catch-up 
other, non-exposed, cohorts. Finally, Haas and Campirano (2006), using cross-country 
data, plot the pubertal growth rate on height just before the onset of puberty. They find 
that children from populations that have lower pre-pubertal heights seem to experience 
greatest growth during puberty. 
5.7 Concluding discussion 
The empirical analysis of catch-up growth requires longitudinal data or cohort studies that 
span the entire growth period. Catch-up growth is defined as growth in height that is 
above the expected for the child's age and occurs after a period of growth retardation. 
Height-for-age z-score measures the height distance in standard deviations to a healthy 
and well-nourished reference population. The evolution of HAZ scores over time 
therefore provides the exact counterpart of the definition used in the clinical and 
epidemiological literature.  
Part of the existing evidence is plagued by studies that confuse catch-up growth with 
convergence. By regressing HAZ in adulthood on childhood HAZ researchers cannot tell 
whether children are catching-up or faltering. In addition, these tests focus on movement 
within the cohort and are therefore not able to detect widespread catch-up growth in 
populations. The interpretations of these regression estimates are further hampered by 
regression-to-the-mean.  
Aside from the methodological contribution, I also provide new evidence for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Using longitudinal data for the Kagera region in Tanzania, I document 
considerable catch-up growth. Nearly 75 per cent of the children experienced catch-up 
growth: after a period of growth retardation (HAZ < 0) in early childhood they 
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experienced growth that was above the expected (ΔHAZ > 0). The mean HAZ-score in 
the cohort improves from -1.86 in early childhood to -1.20 by adulthood. The difference 
between the predicted adult height in early childhood and the actual adult height is around 
4.5 centimetres for boys and 5 centimetres for girls. The graphical analysis shows that 
most of this observed catch-up growth takes place in puberty.  
The existing literature emphasises the importance of early childhood conditions on adult 
outcomes. This essay shows that not everything is set in stone after early-life: short and 
stunted children do not necessarily end up short and stunted adults. The observed pubertal 
catch-up growth may also have implications for economic outcomes in adulthood. Several 
studies have documented strong correlation between adult height and earnings in both 
developed and developing countries (for recent reviews, see Currie and Vogl 2013, 
Steckel 2009). Studies from developing countries find that taller people are more 
productive, and therefore earn more, in tasks that require physical strength (Haddad and 
Bouis 1991, Schultz 2002, Dinda et al. 2006, Thomas and Strauss 1997). In rich 
developed countries, the existence of the height premium is more puzzling as occupations 
increasingly require more brain than brawn. Studies using data for the US and the UK 
have attributed the height premium to the correlation between adult height and non-
cognitive skills (Persico, Postlewaite, and Silverman 2004) or cognitive development in 
early childhood (Case and Paxson 2008), or both (Schick and Steckel 2010). Recently, 
Lundborg, Nystedt, and Rooth (2013) employing rich data on Swedish conscripts, find 
that taller individual earn more because adult height is positively correlated with having 
a better family background and better cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Somewhat 
surprisingly, also physical capacity, measured as muscular strength, plays a role in 
explaining the height premium in Sweden. Due to data limitations, these types of studies 
are rare in developing country contexts. Therefore, whether the origins of the height 
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premium in poor countries lie in the early-life conditions (through early childhood 
nutrition affecting cognitive development) or in adult outcomes (e.g. physical strength) 
remains an unresolved question (Vogl 2012, Currie and Vogl 2013).  
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6 Conclusions 
This thesis has employed truly exceptional panel data to examine two central themes 
within development economics. The length of the panel offers unprecedented 
opportunities to study long-term development processes in a Sub-Saharan African 
context. Careful tracking of those who moved makes the data set an ideal for analysing 
various aspects of internal migration. It also minimizes (potentially non-random) attrition 
when studying long-run health and poverty dynamics at the individual or household level.    
The three essays presented in this thesis provide important contributions within each of 
their respective topics. However, any claim that this thesis has created "[…] new stylised 
facts for the next generation of development research" (Dercon, Krishnan, and Krutikova 
2013p. 16), would certainly be far too extravagant. The purpose of this concluding chapter 
is to discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of each essay, and suggest avenues for 
future research. 
The main objective of the first essay is to document what happens to a traditional 
institution, like informal insurance, in a society undergoing a modernization process 
accompanied by massive internal migration. The economics literature often treats 
institutions as fixed in time. In this essay we document how a traditional institution adapts 
to and interacts with the transformation process. The strength of the essay lies in its ability 
to describe this process within linked extended family networks, over a long two decade 
time period and with 'real world' data. The drawback of not having experimental data is 
that we cannot provide iron-clad proof of causality. Although we rule out certain sources 
of endogeneity, we cannot make the claim that our findings are generalizable to other 
settings where the selection into migration is different. Finally, one of the initial 
motivators for this study was to understand whether the social norms impose a significant 
123 
 
 
 
cost to migration. In the kinship poverty trap model (see Hoff and Sen 2006) costly 
actions imposed by the home-community on the migrants could lead some migrants to 
sever links with home. Knowing that some of its productive members may leave and 
never look back, the kinship network can set up endogenous exit barriers (e.g. through 
values and norms about migration), preventing some of its most productive members to 
leave in the first place. Such exit barriers would then provide an explanation to the puzzle 
why people do not migrate despite the high returns (causally) attached to it (Beegle, De 
Weerdt, and Dercon 2011). Our findings do not support this notion. First, we find that 90 
per cent of the migrants maintain links to their home community. Second, the estimated 
'tax rate' of three to five per cent seems too low to be a significant brake on a migrant’s 
growth. It appears then that the missing piece to this migration puzzle lies elsewhere. The 
search therefore continues and constitutes an exciting path in my future research. 
In the second essay, I examine how local weather shocks shape short-run consumption 
outcomes and long-run migration patterns in Kagera. This essay makes a number of 
important contributions to the literature. First, it is the first to quantify the welfare impacts 
of temperature shocks using micro-level data from Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, I study 
the impact of these temperature shocks on long-term migration decisions over a 15-year 
period. Finally, the simple theoretical model provided in this essay helps to interpret the 
findings that go against the more traditional view of migration (e.g. Harris and Todaro 
1970). The limitations of this study relate to external validity. By focusing on a fairly 
small geographical area, I cannot be certain whether these results generalise to other 
regions of Tanzania, let alone other parts of Africa. Although the data requirements are 
high, the way forward is to undertake similar research in other parts of Africa. Finally, 
the structural transformation process (e.g. Lewis 1954) appears to be underway in 
emerging Africa. In order to understand the role of weather and climate over the full-
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cycle of this process, it would be interesting to exploit historical data on migration 
patterns and temperatures, for example for 19th-20th century England, or for another 
modern-day rich country. This constitutes another path in my future research.  
The third essay makes an important methodological and empirical contribution in the field 
of Economics and Human Biology. First, it demonstrates that the recent literature 
measures catch-up growth incorrectly by confusing catch-up growth with within-
population convergence. In addition, the empirical part of the essay concludes that not 
everything is set in stone after early childhood: short and stunted children do not 
necessarily become short and stunted adults. The strength of the empirical analysis lies in 
the length of the survey permitting me to observe the children's entire growth process. 
Previous studies have largely employed panel data sets of shorter length and, therefore, 
have not been able to analyse the growth process over the pubertal period. Finally, this 
study opens up a number of exciting avenues for future research. Understanding the 
causes for this pubertal catch-up growth is the first step. Moradi (2010) puts forward a 
number of interesting propositions. First, the disease environment is less harsh in puberty 
than in early childhood. As such, given that children grow rapidly also in puberty, the 
elasticity with which calories translate into growth in height is likely to be larger. Second, 
adolescents contribute to the household income and this may improve their intra-
household bargaining power leading to increased food shares within the household. 
Investigating these channels forms an interesting path for future research. The second step 
is to understand how this catch-up growth shapes economic outcomes in adulthood. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, adult height is associated with higher earnings in a wide variety 
of contexts. In contrast to the rich developed world, a large part of the African working 
population is still engaged in agricultural production. As such, the returns to brawn may 
still be considerable. If height is then correlated with strength, then this pubertal catch-up 
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growth is likely to improve living standards in adulthood. Attempting to shed light on this 
issue comprises part of my future research agenda. 
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Appendices 
Appendices: Essay 1 
 
Appendix A: Is there a gender dimension in risk sharing? 
 
Table A.1: replicating Column 1 in Table 3.8 using gender interactions 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita consumption growth  
Number of households that experienced a shock in the 
network 
-0.050** 
(0.024) 
--- Interacted with:  
* male migrant 0.001 
 (0.034) 
Own shock -0.078 
 (0.047) 
--- Interacted with:  
* male migrant -0.053 
 (0.105) 
male migrant 0.146** 
 (0.067) 
Number of observations 1,270 
R2 0.465 
Adjusted R2 0.452 
Note: a household was categorized as a male migrant household if there was 
at least one male PHHM residing in the household. Out of the 1,270 migrant 
households, 63 per cent are categorised as female migrant households and 
37 per cent as male migrant households. For other notes see Table 3.8. 
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Table A.2: replicating Column 1 in Table 3.9 using gender interactions 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita consumption growth  
Number of non-migrant hhs that experienced a shock in the 
network 
-0.063** 
(0.032) 
--- Interacted with:  
*male migrant 0.025 
 (0.050) 
Number of migrant hhs that experienced a shock in the 
network 
-0.026 
(0.038) 
--- Interacted with:  
*male migrant -0.035 
 (0.071) 
Own shock -0.076 
 (0.047) 
--- Interacted with:  
*male migrant -0.053 
 (0.105) 
male migrant 0.146** 
 (0.067) 
Number of observations 1,270 
R2 0.466 
Adjusted R2 0.451 
Note: a household was categorized as a male migrant household if there was 
at least one male PHHM residing in the household. Out of the 1,270 migrant 
households, 63 per cent are categorised as female migrant households and 
37 per cent as male migrant households. For other notes see Table 3.9. 
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Table A.3: Other transactional insurance motive tests in Table 3.10 by gender 
 Column 1 Column 2 
Dependent variable: (logged) per capita 
consumption growth 
Males Females Males Females 
Number of non-migrant hhs that experienced a 
shock in the network 
-0.018 -0.062* 0.007 -0.129 
(0.047) (0.034) (0.077) (0.096) 
--- Interacted with:     
 * Share of land in BLV in total land portfolio -0.001 -0.075   
 (0.097) (0.065)   
 * Number of years since the last PHHM migrated 
into this hh 
  -0.005 0.005 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
Own shock -0.106 -0.093* -0.153* -0.092* 
 (0.089) (0.049) (0.092) (0.051) 
Share of land in BLV in total land portfolio 0.373*** 0.211***   
 (0.101) (0.071)   
Household does not own land 0.194** 0.315***   
 (0.084) (0.065)   
Number of years since the last PHHM migrated 
into this hh 
  0.004 -0.005 
   (0.006) (0.005) 
Number of observations 474 796 474 796 
R2 0.533 0.449 0.502 0.423 
Adjusted R2 0.500 0.426 0.469 0.401 
For notes, see Table 3.10. 
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Appendix B: First-stage regression results of Column 3 in Table 3.7 
Dependent variable: (logged) hh per capita consumption in 
1991 
 
Included instruments:  
Own shock -0.019 
 (0.018) 
Number of split-off hhs stayed 0.018 
 (0.019) 
Number of split-off hhs moved 0.019 
 (0.014) 
Age of oldest PHHM in the 2010 hh 0.001** 
 (0.001) 
A PHHM is head of this 2010 hh 0.005 
 (0.023) 
A PHHM is spouse of this 2010 hh's head 0.036 
 (0.025) 
A PHHM is child of this 2010 hh's head -0.008 
 (0.034) 
A divorced PHHM in 2010 hh -0.037 
 (0.038) 
A widowed PHHM in 2010 hh -0.015 
 (0.033) 
A married PHHM in 2010 hh -0.032 
 (0.023) 
Max years of education of PHHM in this 2010 hh 0.015*** 
 (0.004) 
Number of PHHMs in this 2010 hh -0.024* 
 (0.012) 
Natural log value of assets in 1991 0.081*** 
 (0.027) 
Education of hh head in 1991 0.024** 
 (0.011) 
Head was male in 1991 0.212*** 
 (0.075) 
Age of hh head in 1991 0.006 
 (0.006) 
Age of head squared -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Males 0-5 years in 1991 -0.064*** 
 (0.023) 
Males 6-15 years in 1991 -0.045*** 
 (0.015) 
Males 16-60 years in 1991 0.022 
 (0.018) 
Males 61+ years in 1991 -0.176** 
 (0.079) 
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Females 0-5 years in 1991 -0.035 
 (0.025) 
Females 6-15 years in 1991 -0.034** 
 (0.017) 
Females 16-60 years in 1991 -0.017 
 (0.015) 
Females 61+ years in 1991 -0.030 
 (0.042) 
Hh had a non-earth floor in 1991 0.268*** 
 (0.059) 
Excluded instruments:  
(Negative rainfall deviation) * (Age of hh head in 1991) 0.002 
 (0.004) 
(Negative rainfall deviation) * (Education of hh head in 1991) 0.048* 
 (0.027) 
(Negative rainfall deviation) * (Head was male in 1991) 0.355** 
 (0.159) 
Number of observations 2,349 
R2 0.228 
Adjusted R2 0.201 
Under-identification test:  
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 8.780 
p-value 0.032 
Weak identification tests:  
Cragg-Donald Wald F Statistic 19.12 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 5.419 
Over-identification test:  
Hansen-J statistic 1.124 
p-value 0.570 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cluster-robust standard errors by 
baseline village are in parenthesis. Regression includes baseline village fixed 
effects. PHHM refers to previous household member (i.e. person interviewed at 
the baseline). 
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Appendices: Essay 2 
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Appendix C: Quantile regression results 
 
C.1: Impact of temperature variation on household consumption 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
dependent variable: 
(logged) household per 
capita consumption 
OLS q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
q25 vs. 
q75 
q10 vs. 
q90 
temperature (°C) 
-0.149** -0.169 -0.283*** -0.180** -0.147 -0.139 0.136 0.030 
(0.060) (0.125) (0.105) (0.089) (0.096) (0.131) (0.123) (0.174) 
rainfall (mm) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
household level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
village dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
wave dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
quarter of year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 3,277 
R2/ Pseudo-R2 0.452 0.247 0.244 0.265 0.295 0.330 n/a n/a 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Column 1 repeats Column 2 in Table 4.2 without household fixed effects and uses village dummies and household level controls instead. 
Columns 2-6 presents the results based on quantile regression and columns 7-8 inter-quantile regression techniques. 
Village clustered (Column 1) or bootstrapped (Columns 2-8) standard errors (200 repetitions) are in parenthesis. 
Household level controls include household assets (land size and type of floor), head's characteristics (gender, age, education) and 
variables capturing household composition and size. 
 
147 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Alternative specifications for the migration models 
 
Table D.1: Impact of temperature variation on migration among males 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
temperature -0.023*** 0.002 -0.006 -0.015** -0.017*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
spell year   0.003*** -0.004** -0.018*** 
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
(spell year) 2    0.000*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.001) 
(spell year) 3     -0.000*** 
     (0.000) 
year dummies yes no no no no 
Likelihood-
ratio test 
χ2(15) = 
57.25 
n/a χ2 (1) = 22.18 χ2 (2) = 36.28 χ2 (3) = 42.16  
Observations 13,225 13,225 13,225 13,225 13,225 
Pseudo-Log 
likelihood 
-2685.366 -2721.045 -2706.245 -2699.604 -2695.605 
Note: Column 2 is the restricted model in the Likelihood ratio tests in Columns 1, 3-5. 
The covariates and other notes are the same as in Table 4.4. 
 
Table D.2: Impact of temperature variation on migration among females 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx 
temperature -0.001 0.007 0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
spell year   0.001* -0.006*** -0.013** 
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
(spell year) 2    0.000*** 0.002* 
    (0.000) (0.001) 
(spell year) 3     -0.000 
     (0.000) 
year dummies yes no no no no 
Likelihood-
ratio test 
χ2(15) = 
44.53 
n/a χ2 (1) = 8.22 χ2 (2) = 11.98 χ2 (3) = 13.72 
Observations 11,737 11,737 11,737 11,737 11,737 
Pseudo-Log 
likelihood 
-3,225.630 -3,247.281 -3,246.080 -3,242.010 -3,241.139 
Note: Column 2 is the restricted model in the Likelihood ratio tests in Columns 1, 3-5. The 
covariates and other notes are the same as in Table 4.5. 
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Appendix E: Testing the stability of the temperature estimates 
 
Figure E.1: temperature coefficients for males, omitting each village in turn 
 
Note: dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
Figure E.2: temperature coefficients for females, omitting each village in turn 
 
Note: dashed lines represent the 95% confidence intervals 
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Appendix F: Linear probability models 
Table F.1: linear probability models with village and individual level fixed 
effects 
 males females 
 1 2 3 4 
temperature -0.025*** -0.032* -0.000 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) 
rainfall -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
individual level FE no yes no yes 
village FE yes no yes no 
household level controls yes no yes no 
year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 13,225 13,225 11,737 11,737 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.069 0.019 0.090 
R2 0.028 0.071 0.022 0.092 
Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the village level. The odd columns 
contain the same set of control variables as in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. 
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Appendices: Essay 3 
 
Appendix G: Descriptive statistics for the British Cohort Study 
Table G.1: Evolution of HAZ scores in the British cohort (BCS70) 
  BCS70 
  mean std. dev. 
age in months (t=0) 60.84 1.307 
height (t=0) 108.8 5.035 
height (t=1) 171.0 9.881 
HAZ1 (t=0) 0.01 1.056 
HAZ2 (t=1) 0.17 1.026 
difference in HAZ: 0.16 0.91 
   
t-test: HAZt=0 = HAZ t=1 10.56 
percentage: HAZ t=0 < -2  3% 
percentage: HAZ t=1 < -2 1% 
percentage: HAZ t=0 < -3 1% 
percentage: HAZ t=1  < -3 0% 
sample size 9,635 
note: t=0 refers to early childhood, t=1 to adulthood. 
HAZ scores calculated using the US 2000 
NCHS/CDC as the reference population.  
Adult heights are based on self-reports. Sensitivity 
tests (available from the author) were conducted to see 
if the main findings are affected by this. They were 
not. 
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Appendix H: Why estimating Equation (5.1) using raw measures of height is 
not appropriate? 
Estimating Eq. (5.1) using raw measures of height artificially inflates the 𝛽 coefficient. 
This can be demonstrated if we transform Equation (5.2) to = 𝑟𝑦,𝑥 
𝜃𝑦
𝜃𝑥
, where 𝑟𝑦,𝑥 is the 
correlation coefficient and 
𝜃𝑦
𝜃𝑥
 is the ratio of standard deviations of the two variables. The 
dispersion in the height distribution varies with age and increases as children grow older. 
This inflates the ratio of standard deviations and leads to a larger 𝛽 coefficient (other 
things being equal). The use of height-for-age z-scores circumvents this problem as they 
measure the distance to the normal growth curve at each age, making the standard 
deviations less dependent of the age when the child was measured. Cameron, Preece, and 
Cole (2005) make a similar point discussing the relationship between catch-up growth 
and regression-to-the-mean.   
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Appendix I: The impact of measurement error on 𝜷 
In a simple linear bivariate regression such as Equation (5.1), the magnitude of the 
downward bias can be calculated using the following formula (see, for example, Deaton 
1997, 99): 
H.1 𝛽
𝜃𝑥
2
𝜃𝑒
2 + 𝜃𝑥
2 = 𝛽𝜆,  
where 𝜃𝑥 is the true standard deviation of the correctly measured height (unobserved), 
and 𝜃𝑒 is the standard deviation of the measurement error. The measurement error inflates 
the denominator causing a downward bias in the convergence estimate. The term 𝜆 is then 
the reliability ratio measuring the magnitude of the downward bias. 
The standard deviation in the early childhood height observed in the British cohort is 
5.034. To get a sense of the potential bias, I calculate the impact of various level of zero-
mean measurement error on 𝛽. As can be seen in Table below, a small level of 
measurement error leads to a negligible downward bias in the 𝛽 coefficient. Even 
measurement error that has a standard deviation of 1 cm (i.e. 32 % of the height 
measurements contain more than 1 cm of measurement error), biases the estimate 
downward only by four percentage points and cannot explain the convergence finding in 
Table 5.1. It is difficult to imagine measurement error of this magnitude in any carefully 
constructed survey. In this light, adjustments, such as instrumental variables techniques, 
to address measurement error seem unnecessary.  
 
 
153 
 
 
 
Table I.1: the impact of measurement error (ME) on 𝜷 
std. dev. of 
ME reliability ratio 
0.01 0.999996 
0.1 0.999606 
0.25 0.997541 
0.5 0.990235 
0.75 0.978293 
1 0.962051 
1.25 0.941944 
1.5 0.918482 
Note: standard deviation of height 
used in this example is 5.034, based 
on my own calculations from the 
BCS70 data 
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Appendix J: Additional attrition tests for the Kagera Health and Development 
Survey  
 
Table J.1: KHDS Attrition tests: initial HAZ scores by sample category 
  N  mean sd  t-stat* 
in the final sample 540 -1.86 1.155 n/a 
deceased after 1991-94 69 -2.10 1.396 1.37 
not measured in 2010 257 -1.74 1.220 -1.32 
missing date of birth 18 -1.51 1.198 -1.22 
* Welch t-test testing the difference in means against the first category (in the final 
sample) 
 
Table J.2: KHDS adult HAZ scores by migration status in 2010 
 2010 
 N mean sd t-stat* 
non-migrant 258 -1.21 1.012 n/a 
migrant 282 -1.20 0.995 -0.0299 
* Welch t-test testing the difference in means against the first category (non-
migrant) 
 
 
 
